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Abstract
A part of Freedman and Montanari's (1980) managerial reward 
allocation model was examined in the present study. The hypotheses 
focused on two categories of antecedent variables, organizational and 
managerial, and on the dependent variable of choice of mode of reward 
allocation. They were tested utilizing questionnaire data collected 
from 155 managers in eleven financial institutions. The only 
hypothesis that was confirmed related managerial pay increase goals 
to the choice of reward allocation mode. In order to test the 
relative importance of different managerial and organizational 
variables in determining the mode of reward allocation mode, stepwise 
regression analyses were performed for each reward allocation mode. 
The results of the stepwise regressions suggested that: (a) 
organizational variables and managerial variables interact to 
influence the choice of reward allocation mode, and (b) there was no 
consistent relationship between any two sets of predictors for any 
one mode. Overall, the results indicated that the relationships 
between single variables and reward allocation modes were less strong 
than in previous laboratory studies. However, when managerial and 
organizational variables were considered simultaneously, a number of 
significant relationships were found. The results also pointed to a 
strong need for refinement of measurement of reward allocation modes 
so that continued examination of the reward allocation process using 
Freedman and Montanari's (1980) model can be profitable.
ix
Managerial Reward Allocations:
A Test of Freedman and Montanari's Model 
Managerial reward allocations are a major concern to 
organizations because of their impact on employee behavior and 
organizational effectiveness (Freedman & Montanari, 1980). Until 
recently there has been no integration of the disjointed research 
concerning managerial reward allocation behavior. Freedman and 
Montanari (1980) have attempted to fill this gap by proposing a 
comprehensive model of the process. No research efforts have been 
directed toward testing the numerous relationships hypothesized by 
their model to affect managerial reward allocation decisions. 
Therefore, the purpose of the present research is to provide a test 
of a portion of their model.
The Freedman and Montanari Managerial Reward Allocation Model 
Freedman and Montanari's model is reasonably complex. 
Unfortunately, they do not provide a summary figure of the model. 
Such a figure, which should lead to a better understanding of their 
model, has been devised by this author (See Figure 1). This figure 
will now be used to explain their model in detail.
As Figure 1 indicates, the major components of the model are 
antecedent variables, choice of reward allocation mode, reward level 
decision, and decision outcomes. The focus of the present research 
will be two antecedent variables, organizational variables and 
managerial variables, and the choice of mode of reward allocation.
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Antecedent Variables 
Antecedent variables are classified into four categories: 
environmental, organizational, managerial, and subordinate. 
Environmental Variables
Managerial reward allocation decisions occur within a broad 
dynamic environmental context. Several environmental factors are 
proposed to affect the decision process: general economic
conditions, the labor market, comparable wage rates in other 
organizations, minimum wage requirements, and outside job offers. 
Since environmental variables will not be included in the present 
research, they will not be reviewed any further.
Organizational Variables
Freedman and Montanari include several organizational variables 
in their model: reward policies, existing pay and reward structure,
salary budget, and organizational demographics. Since organizational 
variables will be investigated in this research, a comprehensive 
review of the literature concerning each of these variables follows.
Reward policies. Organizational goals of the reward allocation 
and pay secrecy are elements of organizational reward policies. The 
effects of stated organizational goals of the reward policies on 
allocation decisions have been investigated mainly in the context of 
equity theory. This research indicates that greater rewards are 
allocated to poor performers when allocators are given the goal of
Lmotivating the workers to their highest performance than when they 
are told to reward employees as fairly as possible (Greenberg, 1978b; 
Greenberg & Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal & Whiteside, 1973), The 
tendency to refrain from allocating low rewards to poor performers 
has been found in other studies concerning organizational goals 
(Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972; Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 
1969; Murdoch, 1967; Thibaut & Gruder, 1969). As indicated by 
these studies, this tendency may be due to allocators' fears of 
negative effects on employees, such as reduced motivation to improve 
performance, dissatisfaction and retaliation, or turnover.
Other organizational goals have been examined. Lor example, 
when the allocator's instructed goal is to keep high performers and 
weed out poor performers rather than to retain all employees, low 
performers receive lower rewards (Landau £ Leventhal, 1976). 
Furthermore, when the stated goal is to avoid the possibility of 
conflict within the group, poorer performers are rewarded more 
highly, and at the higher performer's expense, than when the 
possibility of group conflict is not to be considered ^Landau & 
Leventhal, 1976).
From the above research it is clear that stated organizational 
goals should influence the manager’s reward allocation behavior. 
However, the literature involving organizational goals is deficient 
in several respects relative to the reward allocation process. 
First, having been conducted in laboratory settings, the above 
research may not be generalizable. In these st udies, one
organizational goal has been explicitly stated. Clearly, an
5organization may have multiple goals toward which a manager must 
strive, such as retaining or eliminating certain employees, 
minimizing conflict, or improving employee performance. Extending 
the research to an organizational setting presents an opportunity to 
assess the manager's reactions to multiple organizational goals.
The effects of pay secrecy, a prevalent policy in 
organizations, on pay decisions have been discussed by Lawler (1976). 
He conceived of pay secrecy as allowing managers to make pay 
decisions with more freedom since they do not have to explain to 
employees why certain allocations were made. Lawler also notes that 
open pay policies may be counterproductive by leading the manager to 
make equal allocations so that the threat of having to explain an 
unequal pay decision is minimized. Laboratory research has generally 
shown that pay secrecy influences managerial reward allocation 
decisions. When only the experimenter or non co-worker was aware of 
the subject's allocation decisions, which is similar to conditions of 
a pay secrecy policy in an organization, equity was the preferred 
mode of allocation. Further indicated by this research was that when 
co-workers were aware of the subject's allocation decisions, similar 
to open pay policy in an organization, equality was preferred 
(Leventhal, et al., 1972; Reis & Gruzen, 1976).
The interpretation of the effects of pay secrecy policies on 
reward allocations is further complicated, however, when other 
variables are considered as moderators. Kidder, Bellettirie, and 
Cohn (1977) found that for male and female allocators, allocation 
decisions vary when the decision is to be made public or to be kept
6anonymous. Males allocated rewards based on Inputs (equitably) when 
the decision is public, and divide rewards equally when the decision 
is anonymous. Females respond in the reverse direction. Equality is 
chosen by females in the public condition, and equity is chosen in 
the anonymous condition. Hence, norms consistent with sex roles are 
followed in public decisions, and violated in anonymous decisions. 
Freedman and Montanari (1980) infer from Kidder et al.’s findings 
that in organizations where pay secrecy is the policy, allocators 
will tend to violate organizational reward norms, while when an open 
pay policy exists, the allocator will adhere to organizational reward 
norms.
Existing pay and reward structure. Freedman and Montanari 
(1980) include reward norms of the pay system and the criteria which 
managers use in reward decisions as factors contributing to the 
existing pay and reward structure.
Reward allocations are guided to some degree by the normative 
structure of the organization's pay system (Wiggins, 1966). As 
equity theory researchers suggest, managers may refer to the salary 
levels and pay raises of some referent source for obtaining 
information on reward norms (Adams, 1963, 1965; Goodman, 1974). 
Various referent sources may be used for comparison. The employee's 
own pay level is one referent source. Research has indicated that 
employees whose performance or merit ratings are viewed as being 
disproportionately higher than their salaries are rewarded a higher 
raise than those employees whose performances or merit ratings are 
perceived as disproportionately lower than their salaries (Birnbaum,
71983; Greenberg, 1978a). The norms of others' pay levels may also 
be a referent source. For example, the manager's own reward level
has been found to be used as a precedent for subordinate allocations 
(Goodman, 1975). Furthermore, employees may be compared with their 
peers in the organization. Birnbaum (1983) found that when comparing 
employees with equal merit but unequal salaries, allocators perceive 
the lower paid employee to be deserving of a higher raise. Based on
the research involving reward norms, allocation decisions appear to
be influenced by the recipient's current pay level, as well as
others' current pay levels.
Organizational criteria for reward allocations are also 
considered to be part of the existing pay and reward structure. Some
of the most commonly researched organizational criteria include
length of service (seniority), education and experience, 
responsibility, level and quality of job performance, effort on the 
job, scarcity of skills in the labor market, the nature of the job, 
increases in pay levels inside and outside the organization, and cost 
of living (Dyer, Schwab, & Theriault, 1976; Lawler, 1966). Great
fluctuations between and even within organizations in the types and 
rankings of criteria used in the reward allocation decision are 
expected (Freedman & Montanari, 1980). Therefore, it is first
necessary to define which criteria the organization considers to be 
relevant to the reward allocation decision.
Salary budget. The salary budget of the organization is 
hypothesized by the model to influence a manager's reward allocation 
decisions. If the budget does not allow the manager sufficient funds
8to allocate rewards appropriately based on performance on 
organizational criteria, then the manager may be faced with the 
ambiguous task of allocating rewards based on guidelines which are no 
longer applicable to the situation. Here, the question becomes one 
of determining the impact or salience of budgetary constraints in 
organizational reward allocations.
Even though Fossum and Fitch (1985) found budgetary constraints 
to be considered second only to performance when making reward 
allocations, research on insufficient reward funds, or scarcity, has 
been somewhat limited. Researchers found that in allocating
insufficient monetary rewards, allocators considered and responded to 
the needs of the recipient (Greenberg, 1979; Leventhal & Weiss, 
1975, cited in Greenberg, 1981). Other research involving allocation 
of insufficient rewards found that male and child allocators who 
divided monetary rewards between themselves and their co-workers for 
performance on a task tended to retain more rewards for themselves in 
the insufficient condition than they did in the sufficient condition 
(Coon, Lane, & Lichtman, 1974; Lane & Messe, 1972). Research 
considering abundant or oversufficient reward pools is practically as 
scant. In a laboratory setting, Lane and Messe (1972) found a 
tendency for males to keep more rewards for themselves in 
oversufficient conditions than in sufficient conditions.
Due to the nature of the task, however, the results of the 
studies concerning insufficient and oversufficient reward pools are 
generalizable to an organizational setting only in situations where 
managers must allocate rewards to themselves as well as their
9subordinates out of the same pool. In order to better understand the 
use of scarce and abundant reward pools in organizations, it will be 
necessary to extend the research to situations in which rewards are 
to be allocated among subordinates only.
Organizational demographics. Only a small amount of research 
has considered organizational demographics. Size of the organization 
and industry type have been found to influence salary levels (Rock & 
Sym-Smith, 1977). With regard to size, employees of larger 
organizations have been found to have higher average salary levels 
than employees of smaller organizations (Rock & Sym-Smith, 1977). 
Furthermore, larger organizations will rely more heavily on rules and 
procedures than will smaller organizations due to their tendency 
toward bureaucratization (Hall, 1972; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & 
Turner, 1969).
In summary, organizational variables as presented in this model 
may mediate the reward allocation decision process.
Managerial Variables
Freedman and Montanari include several managerial variables in 
their model: personal goals and criteria, beliefs about employee
motivation, and reward allocator characteristics. The research on 
these four managerial variables will now be presented.
Managerial goals and criteria. The possible managerial reward 
allocation goals are identical to those presented as possible 
organizational reward allocation goals. To reiterate, the goal of 
the reward allocation may be to reward employees as fairly as 
possible, to retain all employees or high performing employees, to
10
motivate employees to higher performance, to weed out poor 
performers, or to minimize conflict within the work group. Each of 
these goals when pursued by the manager will have different effects 
than will organizational goals on the reward allocation decision. 
The reward allocation decision will be further complicated when the 
manager is striving to fulfill multiple personal goals in the reward 
allocation.
There is some research exploring the criteria which managers 
utilize in allocation decisions. One study found that managers tend 
to use pay increase criteria for subordinates which are consistent 
with the criteria used in making their own pay increase decisions 
(Goodman, 1975). A later study indicated, however, that managers 
evaluating subordinates weight performance-based criteria more 
heavily than criteria which they perceive to be used in determining 
their own pay (Dyer et al., 1976). It appears that some
clarification is needed of which criteria managers use in evaluating 
their subordinates for reward allocations.
Beliefs about employee motivation. Freedman and Montanari 
suggest that managers will most often try to tie rewards to 
performance in such a way that employee motivation will be maximized. 
However, the motivational strategy to which managers adhere may vary. 
They note that when attempting to motivate employees, managers may 
choose to adhere to different motivational strategies, for example 
equity theory (Adams, 1965), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), or 
reinforcement theory (Skinner, 1969). The bases of these theories 
are different and, thus, will be briefly outlined.
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In expectancy theory, people are presumed to prefer certain 
outcomes over others and expect satisfaction upon achievement of the 
preferred outcomes. Essentially, a person is motivated toward an 
action to the extent that the outcome of that action is desirable, or 
positively valent, and likely to be achieved. The manager's job, 
therefore, is to increase the subordinate's instrumentality to reach 
a goal (high performance), present positively valent outcomes 
(rewards), and raise the expectancy of achievement of the outcomes in 
such a way that the desired goal of high performance is attained 
(Vroom, 1964 ).
Reinforcement theory has been reformulated by Hamner (1974) for 
the organizational context. Essentially, the manager is responsible 
for reinforcing certain behaviors at a high frequency so that those 
behaviors (high performances) are strengthened and intensified, and 
eventually occur with greater frequency. The manager can make use of 
positive and negative reinforcers, punishment, and a variety of 
reinforcement schedules to increase the chances of occurrence of the 
desired performance (Hamner, 1974).
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) is based on a comparison of the 
ratio of an individual’s inputs (e.g., performance) to outcomes 
(rewards) to some referent other's inputs to outcomes ratio. Equity 
is perceived when these ratios are equal or proportional. When the 
relationship between these ratios becomes unequal or disproportional, 
inequity is perceived. Since inequity may affect performance 
negatively (see Goodman & Freedman, 1971 for a review), the manager's
12
goal is to maintain equitable relationships so that inequity is 
avoided and performance is maximized.
In summary, since the bases of these three motivational 
theories are different, it Is expected that a manager's adherence to 
a motivational belief will influence his or her reward allocation 
behavior. In light of the different behaviors which may result, 
Freedman and Montanari presume that the motivational theory to which 
the manager adheres will differentially influence the reward 
allocation decision.
Reward allocator characteristics. Various individual 
characteristics of the manager have been examined as moderating 
factors in the decision-making process. For example, sex of the 
allocator has been fairly extensively researched (Austin & McGinn, 
1977; Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Landau & Leventhal, 1976; 
Larwood & Moely, 1979; Leventhal & Lane, 1970). The most consistent 
finding was that female allocators allocate more generously and take 
less reward for themselves (Austin & McGinn, 1977; Lane & Messe, 
1971; Leventhal & Lane, 1970). However, some factors have been 
found to moderate sex differences in reward allocations, such as 
public versus private allocation decisions (Kidder, et a l ., 1977),
and the expectation of future interaction with the recipient (Austin 
& McGinn, 1977; Greenberg, 1978a; Leventhal, Weiss, & Buttrick, 
1973; Leventhal & Whiteside, 1973). Therefore, the sex of the 
allocator appears to affect reward allocation decisions differently 
when considered in conjunction with other variables.
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Freedman and Montanari note other characteristics of the 
manager, such as intelligence, achievement, and values (Bass, 1968), 
Protestant Ethic scores (Greenberg, 1979; MacDonald, 1972), and 
nationality (Gergen, Morse, & Gergen, 1980; Mikula, 1974; Moscovi, 
1973), which may also moderate the reward allocation decision 
process. Further investigation is needed in a setting which allows 
consideration of the effects of reward allocator characteristics in 
conjunction with other variables on the reward allocation decision. 
Subordinate Variables
Two major categories of subordinate variables are hypothesized 
to influence the reward allocation decision process: employee inputs
to the organization, such as performance, length of service, 
education and experience, the amount of responsibility and pressure 
experienced on the job, and effort, (Dyer, et al., 1976; Lawler, 
1966), and individual characteristics of the employee, such as sex 
(Terborg, 1977) and age (Rosen & Jerdee, 1976), Since subordinate 
variables will not be included in this research, they will not be 
reviewed further.
Mode of Reward Allocation 
Managers will determine a distribution rule or principle to use 
for simplifying their reward allocation decisions. According to the 
model, equity, equality, need , winner-take-all, and self-interest are 
possible allocation rules or principles from which the manager may 
choose. A review of these allocation modes follows.
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Equity
Equity is believed by some researchers to be the allocat ion 
principle most likely to be dominant in economic situations, such as 
organizational reward allocations (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976a). 
As proposed by Adams (1965), equity theory is concerned with the 
perception of fairness in a social exchange between a person and some 
other. As discussed earlier in this paper, individuals, through a 
process of social comparison of one's input to outcome ratio to some 
referent other's input to outcome ratio, evaluate the fairness or 
equity of situations. In an organizational setting, inputs may 
include such variables as education, tenure, ability, skill, the
degree of voluntary control one has over inputs, and performance
quality (Larwood, Levine, Shaw, & Hurwitz, 1979). Quality of
performance has been found to be most important in equity
considerations (Dyer, et al., 1976; Fossum & Fitch, 1985).
Equitable allocations are intended to improve or at least 
maintain performance by matching rewards to input or performance
levels (Bales, 1950; Porter & Lawler, 1976; Leventhal, 1976b). This 
strategy is based on the idea that unless high rewards are 
forseeable, high inputs are unlikely (Deutsch, 1975). Laboratory 
tests of the equity norm are supportive in that individuals who
report a preference for an allocation of rewards in proportion to
inputs tend to allocate in a manner which is consistent with the 
equity norm (e.g., Lane, et al., 1971; Leventhal, et al., 1972), 
particularly when the differences between high and low performers are 
greater (Elliott & Meeker, 1982). However, the tendency toward
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equitable allocations may wane If allocators foresee a high 
probability of anti-productive competition (e.g., Deutsch, 1953), if 
allocators need to immediately improve poor performers, or if 
allocators prefer not to risk that employees will react against a 
perceived inequity (e.g., Homans, 1961; Lawler, 1971). Therefore, 
while equity may be expected to be the most dominant allocation mode 
in organizational settings, there are obviously factors which arise 
that may cause the reward allocator to prefer an alternative mode of 
allocation.
Equality
Equality distributions are expected to be favored when 
harmonious relations and solidarity among group members are desired, 
or when enjoyable social relations are the goal (Bales, 1955;
Deutsch, 1975; Morgan & Sawyer, 1967; Sampson, 1975). When
decision making becomes increasingly problematic and difficult, such 
as when the allocator is trying to achieve several goals
simultaneously, the ease of using the equality principle may often be 
the factor which determines the use of this rule (Leventhal, 1976b;
Harris & Joyce, 1980). There is some evidence that when performance 
differences are quite noticeable, the difference in reward
allocations between high and low performers is not proportional to
the size of performance differences; however, allocators still 
refrain from complete equality (Leventhal, et al., 1972).
Need
Distributing rewards based on the legitimate needs of 
individuals will be the dominant allocation mode "in cooperative
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relations in which the fostering of personal development and personal 
welfare is the primary goal” (Deutsch, 1975, p. 146). The tendency 
toward allocations baaed on need is intensified in situations where 
the recipient is legitimately dependent on the responsible allocator, 
or in a relationship characterized by a caring-orientation (Deutsch, 
1975). Allocators who were involved in friendship relationships with 
the recipients allocated more rewards to the needier individuals
(Lamm & Schwinger, 1980). In this study, however, females favored 
equitable allocations regardless of need when social relationships 
could be damaged by unequal allocations which favored the needier 
recipient.
Winner-Take-All
In the winner-take-all (WTA) exchange, only one person receives 
reward. Research results indicate that while equity and equality are 
preferred over V7TA, WTA is more acceptable to recipients when part of
their pay is through a WTA exchange, when others suggest that WTA is
acceptable, or when the basis of pay is uncertain (Larwood &
Blackmore, 1977; Larwood, Kavanaugh, & Levine, 1978; Larwood, et 
al., 1979). This allocation is most likely to occur under bonus or 
extra compensation conditions where no actual managerial decision 
making is involved. For example, a winner has successfully 
accomplished the stated conditions of performance, i.e., sold the 
most cars. Therefore, no managerial decision is involved in the 
reward allocation.
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Self-Interest
Managers may also allocate rewards based on self-interest, that 
is, in such a way that maximizes their own pay. Research in the 
laboratory indicates that subjects allocate proportionally more 
rewards to themselvess in insufficient and oversufficient reward 
conditions than in sufficient conditions (Lane & Messe, 1972). Reis 
and Gruzen (1976) suggest that in situations where reward allocations 
arc completely confidential, and hence the motivation to allocate in 
a socially approved manner is absent, self-interest allocations are 
more likely to occur. Self-interest allocations, however, are only 
relevant to organizational reward allocations when managers are 
responsible for allocations to subordinates as well as themselves.
In summary, different allocation modes are utilized by managers 
with the expectation that decision making will be simplified. 
Regardless of which mode or allocation rule the manager employs, each 
is predicted to result in a different reward level decision for the 
same employee (Freedman ft Montanari, 1980).
Reward Level Decision
The reward level decision involves a manager’s decision 
concerning the specific amount of pay increase that will be allocated 
to an employee. The manager's decision about the reward allocation 
level is hypothesized by the model to be determined by both the 
antecedent variables and the reward allocation mode employed by the 
manager. Different reward level decisions may result from managers 
using different modes of reward allocation. The decision made by the 
manager will influence decision outcomes.
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Decision Outcomes 
The managerial reward allocation model predicts that several 
factors will be affected by the reward allocation decision. Freedman 
and Montanari include employee satisfaction, employee performance, 
and the standard for the reward level decision as being influenced by 
the reward level decision. The standard mode of reward allocation is 
influenced by the mode of reward allocation.
Satisfaction
The relationship of rewards to employee satisfaction has been 
extensively discussed (e.g., Dyer, Schwab, & Fossum, 1978; Lawler, 
1971). In fact, research has indicated that pay level is a good 
predictor of pay satisfaction (Dyer & Theriault, 1976; Lawler & 
Porter, 1966; Schwab & Wallace, 1974),
Lawler (1981) has summarized the past pay satisfaction research 
into four conclusions that indicate factors which may moderate the 
reward-pay satisfaction relationship. First, people are satisfied 
with their pay when they receive the amount that they feel they 
deserve (Locke, 1976), rather than when they are underpaid or 
overpaid (Adams, 1965). A second conclusion is that people*s pay 
satisfaction is influenced by a comparison of their rewards to 
others' rewards (Patchen, 1961). A third conclusion is that 
dissatisfaction with pay often results from misperceptions. This 
conclusion is based on evidence which shows that people tend to 
underestimate what others do in their jobs, and overestimate what 
others are paid (Lawler, 1972). Finally, overall job satisfaction 
will be determined by the balance of extrinsic to intrinsic rewards
19
which the employee receives (Lawler, 1971; Quinn & Staines, 1979). 
Therefore, excessively high pay does not compensate for poor working 
conditions, and a favorable work environment does not compensate for 
very low pay.
In summary, rewards have been shown to be related to and to 
even predict satisfaction by a number of researchers. It appears 
that employees are satisfied when their pay is the deserved amount, 
is comparable to relevant others’ pay, is accurately perceived with 
respect to others' pay, and is balanced with non-financial rewards. 
Performance
A considerable amount of research relating rewards to 
subsequent performance has been done in the equity theory context. 
This research has generally involved manipulating overreward or 
underreward.
Several reviews have concluded that underrewarded subjects 
attempt to increase their outcomes in order to restore equity 
(Carrell & Dittrich, 1978; Goodman & Friedman, 1971). While the 
majority of laboratory studies support underreward predictions of 
equity theory, the results in the field are not conclusive (e.g., 
Keaveny & Allen, 1983; Lord & Hohenfeld, 1979).
The laboratory research on overreward is less supportive of 
equity theory (Carrell & Dittrich, 1978). Early overreward research 
has been criticized on methodological grounds (e.g., Pritchard, 
1969). Recent research, however, has indicated that overreward may 
be effective in improving worker performance (Garland, 1973; 
Greenberg & Leventhal, 1976), or perhaps employee perceptions of what
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is equitable are modified to incorporate a higher threshold, i.e., 
one that is closer to the employee's payment (Locke, 1976). As noted 
by Carrell and Dittrich (1978), the way individuals resolve 
overreward inequity has not been satisfactorily shown.
In summary, while a considerable amount of research has 
investigated the relationship of rewards to subsequent performance, 
these studies have been primarily based on equity theory. 
Researchers have pointed out that other factors besides equity are 
important in understanding the influence of rewards on subsequent 
performance (Mahoney, 1979), such as relating specific rewards to 
specific performance levels, and communicating this relationship to 
employees Wallace & Fay, 1983). As Freedman and Montanari (1930) 
point out, by considering the effects of all the components of their 
model, a greater understanding of the relationship of rewards to 
subsequent performance should be achieved.
Standard for the Mode of Allocation and the Reward Level
The mode of reward allocation employed and the reward level 
decision are considered to be outcomes of the decision process in 
that these factors serve to set standards for future reward 
allocation decisions (Freedman, 1986). That is, the currently 
employed mode of reward allocation will serve as a standard for the 
allocation mode employed in future decisions. Likewise, the current 
reward level decision will serve as a standard for the reward level 
decision in future reward allocation decisions. The relationship of 
these standards to future decisions will be discussed in a later 
section of this paper which explains the model’s feedback loops.
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An Explanation of the Managerial Reward Allocation Model 
The Reward Allocation Decision Process
At the first stage of the model, the four categories of 
antecedent variables are hypothesized to interact with each other, as 
represented by the bi-directional arrows between each category. Some 
configuration of antecedent variables is then predicted to influence 
the choice of the mode of reward allocation employed by the manager 
(la). The mode of reward allocation is expected to have a direct 
effect (^) on the reward level decision. Furthermore, this 
configuration of antecedent variables should directly influence the 
reward level decision (lb).
The decision outcomes of employee satisfaction and performance 
are hypothesized to be directly influenced (3a) by the reward level 
decision. In addition, the standard for the mode of reward 
allocation and the standard set for the reward level decision are 
determined by the current mode of reward allocation and the current 
reward level decision (3a, 3b), respectively.
Feedback Loops
Decision outcomes will feedback into the reward allocation 
decision process, thus influencing future decision making. First, 
employee satisfaction, employee performance, and the standards set by 
the mode and level of reward allocation each feedback into future 
decision making by interacting with antecedent variables (4a). As 
Freedman and Montanari explain, several effects can occur in this 
interaction. For example, organization policy modifications may be a 
neccessary response to decision outcomes such as employee
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dissatisfaction or reduced performance. Furthermore, the norms of 
the existing pay and reward structure may be modified based on the
standards set by the mode and level of reward allocation in the
previous decision. Freedman and Montanari also suggest that 
environmental variables, such as inflation rates, may be affected by 
the reward allocation standards.
Decision outcomes are hypothesized to influence the manager's 
future choice of mode of reward allocation (4jj), as well as
influencing future reward level decisions made by the manager (A c ). 
A complete understanding of the managerial reward allocation model, 
including the feedback loops, clarifies the importance of the
circularity of the decision making process. The outcomes of past 
decisions interact with current conditions to influence the present 
decision and its outcomes. The cycle repeats as these outcomes serve 
as input to future managerial reward allocation decision making.
Present Research 
Since a comprehensive test of this model is beyond the scope of 
any one study, the focus here is on selected portions of the model. 
Of the model's four antecedent variables, two of these, 
organizational variables and managerial variables will be examined.
Managerial variables are essential in that the manager is the 
focal decision making person in the reward allocation decision 
process. While the manager is likely to have some degree of 
independence and discretion in the allocation of rewards, he or she
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is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
organizational reward policies and procedures. Thus, organizational 
variables are included in this study in an effort to understand how 
they moderate the effects of the managerial variables in the reward 
allocation decision process.
Environmental variables and subordinate variables will be 
excluded in this study. The broad range and the dynamic nature of 
environmental variables prohibits their inclusion in a study of 
limited magnitude. The individualistic nature of subordinate 
variables is prohibitive in that their inclusion would both exceed 
the scope and limit the generalizabi1 ity of the results of this
study .
Previous research on organizational and managerial variables 
has been deficient in that most studies have incorporated only one or
a few categories of variables (e.g., Austin & McGinn, 1977; Bass, 
1968; Fossum & Fitch, 1983). Therefore, the relative importance of a 
number of antecedent variables on the reward allocation decision has 
not been tested, and conclusions cannot be made. This study will
extend the investigation of variables previously considered in the 
laboratory to an organizat iona1 setting. The pr imary purpose of the 
present research is to assess the relative importance of the 
organizationa1 and managerial variables in the choice of reward 
allocation mode (see Figure 2). Included in this assessment will be 
several hypotheses concerned with the influence of specific 
organizational and managerial variables on this portion of the model.
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Organizational Variables
Several hypotheses have been generated with respect to
organizational variables. These hypotheses along with their
supporting literature will now be presented.
Hypothesis 1 : The organizational goal of the reward allocation will
influence the manager's choice of reward allocation node.
Hypothesis 1A: Equity is expected to be the manager's choice
of allocation mode when reward of performance is the main 
organizational goal.
This hypothesis is based primarily on laboratory research in 
which equity was the preferred node of allocation. That is, lower 
performers received lower rewards, when the stated goal of the reward 
allocation was to keep high performers and to weed out low performers 
(Landau & Leventhal, 1976). The purpose of this hypothesis was to 
extend laboratory findings regarding equity to a field setting.
Hypothesis 1B : Equality will be the manager's choice of
allocation mode when organizational effectiveness is dependent
upon cooperative and harmonious work relationships.
Deutsch (1975) and Leventhal (1976) have suggested that equal 
reward allocations will be made in a unit where cooperation is 
necessary for high performance; however, no research exists to 
support this notion.
Hypothesis 1C; When multiple organizational goals become
salient, a mode other than strict equity will be preferred. 
Laboratory studies in which modes of reward allocation other 
than equity were chosen when the goals were to motivate higher
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performance (e.g., Greenberg, 1978b) or to minimize conflict (Landau 
& Leventhal, 1976) provide the rationale for this hypothesis. This 
hypothesis serves as a test of laboratory findings in a field 
setting.
Hypothesi s 2 : The fluctuation of the pay increase budget will
influence the choice of mode of reward allocation.
This exploratory hypothesis extends earlier laboratory research 
involving oversufficiency, sufficiency, and undersufficiency of 
reward funds (e.g.. Lane & M e s s e , 1972) by considering situations
where allocators are not recipients of the allocated rewards, and by 
considering the effects of reward fund sufficiency on the choice of 
mode of reward allocation.
M a n a g e r  i al V a r i a b l e s
Several hypotheses have been generated with respect to 
managerial variables. These hypotheses along with their supporting 
1 i terature will now be presented .
iil£ othesis 3 : The managerial goal of the reward allocation will
influence the manager's choice of mode of reward allocation.
Freedman and Montanari (1980) predict that managerial goals for 
the reward allocation may differ from organizational goals for the 
reward allocation, yet will still influence the choice of mode of 
reward allocat ion.
JllE othesis 3 A : Equity is expected to be the manager's choice
of allocation mode when individual performance is the main 
managerial g o a l .
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As in Hypothesis 1A, laboratory research in which equity was 
the preferred allocation mode when the stated goal of the reward 
allocation was to keep high performers and weed out low performers 
(Landau & Leventhal, 1976) provides the basis for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 B : Equality will be the chosen allocation mode
when cooperative and harmonious work relationships are 
important to work group effectiveness.
Leventhal (1976) and Deutsch (1975), in a conceptual paper, 
have suggested that equal reward allocations will be made in a unit 
where cooperation is necessary for high performance; however, no 
research exists to support this notion.
Hypothesis 3 C : When multiple goals become salient, a mode
other than strict equity will be preferred.
Laboratory studies in which modes of reward allocation other 
than equity were chosen when the goals were to motivate higher 
performance (e.g., Greenberg, 1978b), or to minimize conflict (Landau 
& Leventhal, 1976) provide the rationale for this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis A : Managers who weight performance based criteria most
heavily are hypothesized to choose equity as an allocation mode more 
frequently than equality or need.
The finding that performance is most important in equity 
decisions (Dyer e t . a l , 1976; Possum & Fitch, 1985) is expected to 
be replicated in this study.
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Interaction of Organizational and Managerial Variables
One comprehensive hypothesis has been generated with respect to 
the effect of the interaction of organizational and managerial 
variables.
Hypothesis 5 : Managerial and organizational variables will influence
the mode of reward allocation. Specifically, managerial and
organizational variables will be differentially related to the 
manager's choice of the allocation modes of equity, equality, and 
n e e d .
This exploratory hypothesis provides a comprehensive test of 
the portin of Freedman and Montanari’s model which predicts that 
managerial and organizational variables will influence the reward 
allocation decision process. Specifically, it tests the relationship 
between managerial and organizational variables and the first step in 
the decision process, the choice of mode of reward allocation by 
determining the relative importance of each of the managerial 
variables and organizational variables in predicting the choice of 
reward allocat i on m o d e .
METHOD
Subjects
The sample consisted of 155 managers, ranging from president to 
branch manager from 11 financial institutions. Seven of these were 
located in the southeast (n- 12; n- 9; n- 35; n« 50; n« 7; n» 38; n« 
35), two in the southwest (n» 14; n» 3), and two in the midwest (n« 
50; n- 3) United States. The sample was approximately 46% female and 
54% male. The average age of the managers was 38.6, and the average 
length of employment in their current position was 4.6 years. Of the 
managers 9.3% completed high school, 6.0% completed an 
Associate/Technical degree, 32.2% completed some college, 23.4% 
completed a college degree, 15.4% completed some graduate training, 
12% completed a Master’s degree, and 0.6% completed a Ph.D. degree. 
In addition, 47.7% of the sample held some type of bank officer 
position, and 52.3% of the sample held nonofficer or branch manager 
positions. Pay increase decisions were made on the average every 12 
months.
Procedure
The author contacted either the personnel director, human 
resources director, or president of each financial institution to 
obtain permission to conduct the study. Data were collected on 
company time, with the questionnaires being distributed to individual 
managers either directly by the researcher, or by the personnel/human
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resource director of each institution if that was preferred by the 
contact person at the institution. Participation in the study was 
voluntary.
The purpose of the study, to determine the factors which
managers consider when making pay increase decisions, was explained
to all participants in the cover letter. In addition,
confidentiality was ensured by asking participants not to place their 
name on the questionnaire, and to forward the questionnaire directly 
to the author in the provided envelope (See Appendix A). In two
institutions, however, the personnel director or president preferred 
that the questionnaires be collected at a central point (the 
personnel office), and returned collectively to the author.
Confidentiality was still ensured by having respondents return their 
questionnaires to the personnel office through inter-office mail, 
sealed in the envelope provided.
Of the 256 questionnaires distributed, 155 were returned, 
indicating a 60.1% response rate. Missing data for some items 
resulted in elimination of questionnaires from some correlations, 
while 15 questionnaires were excluded from stepwise regression 
analyses due to missing d a t a .
Independent Variables
Two types of independent variables were measured, 
organizational variables and managerial variables. The
organizational variables which were measured included organizational 
goals for pay increases, pay secrecy, organizational criteria for pay
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Increases, pay increase budget, and organizational demographics. 
Managerial variables which were measured included managerial goals 
for pay increases, beliefs about employee motivation, managerial
criteria for pay increases, and managerial demographics. With the 
exception of the items used to measure organizational criteria for 
pay increases and managerial criteria for pay increases, all measures 
were constructed by the author. Items were pretested on a sample of 
12 managers for understandability and applicability. Detailed
descriptions of each of these variables follows.
Organizational goals for pay increases. (See Appendix B). In 
this three-item measure, the manager allocated a total of seven 
points among three statements indicating how well the statements
described the organization's goals for the pay increase. The 
statements reflected a goal of rewarding high performance, a goal of 
rewarding cooperative and harmonious relationships, and other goals 
which the manager was to describe in his or her own words.
Table 1 presents the percent of total points allocated to each 
of three possible organizational goals for pay increases. Reward of
performance was obviously the most frequent choice of organizational 
goal for pay increases, with approximately 52% of the managers 
weighting it with five or more of seven possible points. Conversely, 
approximately 95% of the managers weighted the goal of rewarding 
cooperative and harmonious work relationships with less than five of 
the possible seven points. Due to very low percentages of subjects 
who chose the goal categories of "rewarding cooperative and 
harmonious relationships" (5.3%) and "other goals" (6.6%),
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Table 1
Percent of Total Points Allocated to Each of Three Possible
Organizational Goals for Pay Increases
Point values
Goal 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reward high 
performance
9.2 9.3 3.9 9.2 22.4 30.9 5.9 15.1
Reward cooperative 
and harmonious 
relationships
25.0 10.5 36.8 18.4 3.9 1.3 .7 3.3
Other goals 77.6 2.6 5.9 5.3 2.0 .7 .0 5.9
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correlations using these two categories would not be meaningful. 
Therefore, in order to make interpretation of results more simple and 
meaningful, the data on this measure were collapsed into two 
categories. Subjects were placed in the first category, representing 
primary importance being placed on the goal of rewarding high 
performance, if five or more points were allocated to this goal. 
Subjects were placed in the second category if they allocated greater 
than four points to either the goal of rewarding cooperative and 
harmonious work relationships or other goals. This second category 
represented goals for the pay increase which were other than that of 
rewarding high performance.
Pay Secrecy. (See Appendix C). Two items were used to measure 
the extent to which employees were aware of the maximum pay for their 
positions and others' positions, when raises are expected, etc. 
Items asked about the policy for pay secrecy in the organization, and 
what is practiced regarding pay secrecy in the organization. 
Subjects rated these two items on a 1 to 7 scale with "l" defined as 
"Full Disclosure," "4" defined as "Individual Disclosure," and "7" 
defined as "Total Secrecy."
Organizational criteria for pay increases. (See Appendix D).
Ten criteria were rated in terms of their importance according to 
organizational policy on a seven-point likert-type scale anchored by 
"l=Not Important," "4=Somewhat Important," and "7=Very Important," 
These items were a composite of items from Dyer et a l . (1976) and
Lawler (1966). A principal components analysis with a varimax 
rotation was performed on managers' ratings of the pay increase
criteria items. As can be seen in Table 2, nine of the 10 items 
loaded significantly on only one of the three factors. Item 2 was 
eliminated because it loaded significantly on two factors and was 
therefore uninterpretable. The first factor, (Items 1,3, 4, and
10), indicated that primary importance was placed on employee inputs 
(e.g., performance, effort, training and experience, and 
responsibility). These items were summed to form the criterion 
"Employee Inputs - Organizational," Factor II (Items 5 and 6) 
indicated that importance was placed on others' pay levels, and were 
summed to form the criterion "Referent Others' Pay Levels - 
Organizational." The three items (7, 8, and 9) which loaded on 
Factor III indicated that importance was placed on non-performance 
related factors, (i.e., tenure, cost of living, and amount of last 
pay increase), which may determine that an employee deserves a 
certain amount of pay increase. These items were summed to form the 
criterion "Employee Deservingness - Organizational."
Pay increase budget. (See Appendix E). Using the figures 
which managers reported concerning the size of their pay increase 
budget for 1984, 1985 and 1986 (estimated), two measures were formed: 
pay Increase budget change and pay increase budget variance. These 
measures were used because they both represent pay increase budget 
fluctuations. Figures for all three years were used to calculate the 
variance of the pay increase budget. However, figures for only the 
preceding year (1985) and the estimate for the current year (1986) 
were used for the budget change. This was done primarily because of
Table 2
/actor Analyses of the Organizational Criteria for ?ay Increases
farimax factor load ings
r'actor names and item numbers 1 2 3
1. Individual employee' job performance .733 -.148 -.083
C. . Nature of the employee's job .471 .430 .019
7J » Amount of effort expended by the employee .793 -.019 .123
4. Employee's training and experience .593 .309 .321
> • Fay level for comparable positions 
outside the organizati on
.067 .851 .064
6. Fay level for comparable positions 
inside the organization
.001 .858 .040
7. Amount of employee’s last pay increase .017 .051 .733
8. Cost of living -.016 .052 .725
Q.> * Length of service (Seniority) . 1 °-5 .010 .730
10. Level of employee's responsibility .582 .386 .062
pp rcentage of variance explained 71.3 19.2 17.3
N o t e . Item loadings defining factors are underlined.
U>
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recent declining economic trends in the southeast and southwest 
samples which were not accurately reflected by the variance figure.
Organizational demographics. (See Appendix F). Questions 
concerning organizational demographics included the size of the 
organization, and frequency of pay increases.
Managerial goals for pay increases. (See Appendix G). In this 
three-item measure, the manager allocated a total of seven points 
among three statements indicating how they applied to the manager's 
goals for the pay increase. As in the "organizational goals for pay 
increases" section, the statements reflected a goal of rewarding high 
performance, a goal of rewarding cooperative and harmonious 
relationships, and other goals which the manager was to describe in 
his or her own words.
Table 3 presents the percent of total points allocated to each 
of three possible managerial goals for pay increases. As can be 
seen, the results of these analyses parallel those for the analyses 
on the organizational goals measures. Reward of performance was the 
most frequent choice of managerial goal, with approximately 67% of 
the managers weighting it with five or more of the seven possible 
points. Furthermore, approximately 96% of the managers weighted the 
goal of rewarding cooperative and harmonious relationships and other 
goals with less than five of the seven possible points. As with the 
measures of organizational goals, due to the very low percentage of 
subjects who chose the goal categories "rewarding cooperative and 
harmonious relationships" (3.8%) and "other goals" (6.5%), 
correlations using these two categories would not be meaningful.
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Table 3
Percent of Total Points Allocated to Each of Three Possible 
Managerial Goals for Pay Increases
Point values
Goal 0 1 2 3 A 5 6 7
Reward high 7.8 .6 3.9 7.1 33.1 25.3 9.7 12.3
performance
Reward cooperative 20.8 13.0 32.5 26.0 3.9 1.3 .6 1.9
and harmonious 
relationships
Other goals 79.2 3.2 7.1 5.2 .6 .6 .0 3.9
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Therefore, in order to make interpretation of results more 
comprehensible, the data on this measure were collapsed into two 
categories, following the same procedures as for the organizational 
goals items. Subjects were placed in the first category,
representing primary importance being pi aced on the goal of reward i ng 
high performance, if five or more points were allocated to this goal. 
Subjects were placed in the second category if they allocated five or 
more points to either the goal of rewarding cooperative and 
harmonious relationships or other goals. This second category 
represented goals for the pay increase which were other than that of 
rewarding high performance.
Beliefs about employee motivation. (See Appendix H). Three
possible motivational belief statements were presented to the 
managers. Managers chose the one statement representing a belief in 
either reinforcement, expectancy, or equity theory principles, which 
best descri bed his or her beliefs about how to motivate e m p 1oyees 
with pay increases.
M anagerial criteria for pay increases. (See Appendix I). In 
this section of the questionnaire, managers rated the importance of 
the same ten criteria which were included in the organizational 
criteria section, this time according to the importance the manager 
placed on them in pay increase decisions. A principal components 
analysis with a varimax rotation was performed on managers' responses 
to the pay increase criteria items. The initial rotation produced 
four factors, with Factor IV containing only one item (Item 1). 
Because this fourth factor accounted for only a small proportion of
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the variance (1.06), the analysis was recalculated forcing a three- 
factor solution. As can be seen in Table 4, each of the 10 items 
loaded significantly on only one factor. The first factor contained 
items (1, 2, 3, 4, and 10) which indicated that a primary importance 
was placed on employee inputs (e.g., performance, effort, training 
and experience, and responsibility). These items were summed to form 
the criterion "Employee Inputs - Managerial." Factor II (Items 7, 8, 
and 9) indicated that importance was placed on non-performance 
related factors, (i.e., tenure, cost of living, and amount of last 
pay increase), which may determine that an employee deserves a 
certain amount of pay increase. These items were summed to form the 
criterion "Employee Deservingness - Managerial." The two items (3 
and 6) which loaded on Factor III indicated that importance was 
placed on others' pay levels, and were summed to form the criterion 
"Referent Others' Pay Level - Managerial."
Managerial demographics. (See Appendix .1). Quest ions 
concerning managerial demographics included age, sex, educational 
level, years employed in current position, position, and number of 
pay increase decisions in which the manager is involved.
Dependent Variables
The mode of reward allocation was assessed using five different 
measures: mode of reward allocation used in the last pay increase
(three measures), and actual reward allocations (two measures). 
Since previous research has offered no method of measuring the mode 
of reward allocation in an organizational setting, the author
Table 4
factor Analyses of the vlanageT'ial ^nt^ria for Pay Increases
r’actor names and item numbers 7ar imax 
1
factor load 
2
ings
3
I. Individual employee job performance . 29 -.15 .09
2. Nature of the employee's job .39
o1 . .73
3. Amount of effort expended by the employee .74 .07 .01
4. Employee's training and experience .55 .15
5. Pay level for comparable positions 
outside the organization
.14 .17
6. Pay level for comparable positions 
inside the organization
.17 .14
7. Amount of employee's last pay increase ,pq .77 .20
3. Cost of living -.02 .63 .21
9. Length of service (Seniority) .14 ,RO 1 o O'
*
0. bevel of employee's responsibility .71 .25 .07
Percentage of variance explained
29.7 14.0 12,5
Note. Item loadings defining factors are underlined.
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constructed these measures. These Items were pretested on a sample 
of 12 managers for understandabillty and applicability.
Mode of reward allocation used in the last pay increase. Three 
measures of the chosen mode of reward allocation required the manager 
to consider the last pay increase made for employees. First, the
manager reported the greatest and least dollar amounts of pay
increases which were allocated in the last pay increase (See Appendix 
K). From these figures a percentage was calculated (Least 
amount/Greatest amount). This percentage figure fell along a 
continuum ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. That is, as the differences 
between the least and greatest amount of pay increases which were 
allocated increased, the size of the percentage decreased. Equal 
allocations were indicated at the upper end of the continuum, while
equitable allocations were indicated at the lower end of this 
continuum. Need as allocation mode was not identifiable using this 
continuum measure.
Second, the manager was instructed to list the criteria which 
were considered in the last pay increase decision and to rank the 
importance of the listed criteria (See Appendix L). To avoid 
potential problems with demand characteristics, these items were 
administered before any other measures of criteria for pay increases.
Two graduate students independently rated the reported criteria on 
each of four scales representing the modes of reward allocation, 
equity, equality, and need, and other/combination, encompassing the 
criteria which did not distinctly fall into any one of the above 
modes (See Appendix M).
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Reliability assessment of this coding involved checking the 
extent of rater agreement in categorization of criteria listed as 
important in pay increase decisions. According to Guttman (1979) the 
most commonly used measure of rater agreement is:
# of classification agreements
# of agreements + disagreements 
However, this method has been criticized as yielding meaningless 
results because it does not correct for chance agreement (Hollenbeck, 
1978). Thus, Cohen's (1960) Kappa statistic is used, which removes 
chance agreement from calculations:
Kappa = (P -P )/(l-P )
o c c
where P^ is the observed proportion of agreement and P^ . is the chance 
proportion of agreement. The Kappa statistics indicated a 92. 
agreement for the equity category, 89.5% agreement for the equality 
category, 92.5% agreement for the need category, and 88.0% agreement 
for the other/combination category. They provide evidence that the 
criteria were coded consistently enough to serve as the basis of 
further analyses in the s tudy.
The third measure of the reward allocation mode referring to 
the last pay increase included a series of seven statements 
describing each of the three primary modes of reward allocation, 
three possible combinations of reward allocation modes (i.e., equity 
and equality, equity and need, and equality and need), and some other
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situation which was not adequately described by the preceding six
statements (See Appendix N). The manager chose one of the seven
statements which most closely described how he or she felt that pay
increases were allocated in the last pay increase. Table 5 presents 
the number and percent of subjects choosing each mode of reward 
allocation to describe the last pay increase. Responses fell
predominantly in the "equity” category, with the remainder of the
responses dispersed among the "combination" or "other" statements. 
As can be seen, an insufficient number of subjects chose each 
statement for independent analysis of all statements to be 
interpretable. Therefore, data on this measure were analyzed using
only two items, the equity mode of reward allocation (Item 1) and a
combination of equity and equality modes of reward allocation (Item 
A).
In the final two measures of the reward allocation mode the 
manager assumed the role of supervisor over a set of four fictional 
employees among whom a total of $1000 were to be allocated as a pay 
increase (See Appendix 0). Personnel files which were constructed 
for each fictional employee provided the necessary information about 
the employees, including general information about the employee, the
most recent performance appraisal, and the immediate supervisor's 
comments. Information presented in the files varied on the dimensions 
of need for the pay increase (high, low), and level of performance 
(high, low). Performance level was manipulated using the performance 
appraisal form and supervisory comments. Employee need was
manipulated using supervisory comments about the employee's need for
Table 5
Number and Percent of Subjects Choosing Each Mode of Reward 
Allocation to Describe the Last Pay Increase
Mode N 1
1. Equity 107 70.9
2. Equality 0 0.0
3. Need 1 .7
4. Equity and Equality 35 23.2
5. Equity and Need 2 1.3
6. Equality and Need 0 0.0
7. Other 6 4.0
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the pay increase. A manipulation check for these was performed on 
the pretest sample of managers. Results of t-tests performed on the 
manipulation checks using the pretest data, presented in Table 6, 
revealed that the poorly performing employee was rated as a poor
performer, and high performing employees were rated as high 
performers. Furthermore, the employees who were in great need of a 
pay increase were rated as more needy, while the employees who were 
not in great need of a pay increase were rated as not needy. These 
findings indicate that both the employee's performance and need for 
the pay increase were effectively manipulated.
Managers completed this task twice, once according to 
organizational policy for pay increases, and once according to the
manager's own preference for pay increases. These measures were
included to obtain, as realistically as possible, an actual reward 
allocation decision. The allocations made according to managerial 
preference were included in addition to allocations made according to 
organizational policy in order to determine whether managers make
decisions according to policy or allow their own biases or 
preferences to enter into the pay increase decision.
Analyses
Several main effects for variables in Freedman and Montanari's 
model were hypothesized. Specifically, Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 
predicted that the organizational goal of the reward allocation, 
salary budget, managerial goals of the reward allocation, and 
managerial criteria would have main effects on the choice of mode of
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Table 6
Results of t-tests for differences between manipulations of high 
and low performance and of high ani low need
Cond i t i on t
N f EDa
Highi vs Low i 6.07**
Highi vs Low 2 4.50**
Highp vs Low 1 6.21**
Highp vs Low p 4,4-5*#
:igh-| vs Higbp .35
Lo w 1 v:- Low ? 1 .00
r-ii a.-•’ORMANS
.. aL,
High-| vs Lo w i 6 .18**
High2 vs Lowp B .18**
High-( vs Low p 0. ie**
Highp vs Low 8 . 18**
High-] vs High p 0.00
Low^ vs Low ^ 0.00
* *  .01
a Independent t-tests were perform ed between all possible combinations 
of each of two manipulations of high necl and high performance and two 
manipulations of low need and low performance.
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reward allocation. These predictions were tested by correlating each 
mode of reward allocation with these predictor variables.
Hypothesis 5 predicted main effects for the antecedent 
variables (managerial and organizational) on the mode of reward 
allocation (e.g., equity, equality, and need). This hypothesis was 
tested with stepwise regression analyses to determine the major 
predictors of each of the three modes of allocation.
RESULTS
Interrelationships Between Variables
To determine if there were significant interrelationships 
between classes of variables or a problem with multicollinearity, 
correlations among organizational variables and managerial variables 
were calculated. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations 
for managerial and organizational variables are reported in Table 7. 
Disregarding the sign of each correlation, and excluding the perfect 
or near perfect negative correlations between dichotomous measures 
(i.e., organizational goals and managerial goals), the average 
correlation among organizational variables and managerial variables 
was .24, and the highest intercorrelation was .68. Since the average 
intercorrelation among the variables was relatively low, and two 
variables shared no more than 46% of the variance, it was concluded 
that each of the measures had a substantial portion of unshared 
variance. Thus, multicollinearity was not a problem.
Intercorrelations among measures of each mode of reward 
allocation would be desirable, and would indicate that the different 
measures of each mode were assessing the same construct. Means, 
standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the dependent 
measures can be seen in Table 8.
There were five measures of the reward allocation mode of 
equity. These were the percentage of differences between least and 
greatest dollar amounts allocated (percentage), equity-related 
criteria listed/ranked as important in pay increase decisions, the
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manager's choice of the descriptive statement indicating equity as 
the mode used in the last pay increase decision, and the mode used in 
the vignette allocations made both according to organizational policy 
and according to managerial preferences for equitable pay increase 
decisions. The average intercorrelation among the different equity 
mode measures was ,21, which is somewhat lower than desirable for 
measures of the same mode of reward allocation. The descriptive 
statement of equity as being used in the last pay increase decision 
correlated significantly with all other equity mode measures: 
criteria listed/ranked as equity-related (r« .16, £  < .05), vignette 
allocations made equitably both according to organizational policy 
(r« .20, j) < .05) and according to managerial preference (_r« .24, £  <
.01), and with percentage (r* -.28, j) < .01). Overall the
descriptive statement representing equitable allocations was the 
measure of equity which correlated significantly with the greatest 
number of other measures of the equity mode. In addition, a strong
correlation was found (_r= .72, £  < .001) among the two measures
represented by the vignette allocations made equitably both according 
to organizational policy and according to managerial preferences. 
Two measures of the equity mode, however, percentage and equity-
related criteria which the manager listed/ranked as important in pay 
increase decisions, correlated near zero with the other measures of 
the equity mode.
The four measures of the mode of equality were percentage, 
equality-related criteria listed/ranked as important in pay increase 
decisions and vignette allocations made equally according to both
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organizational policy and to managerial preferences. The average
correlation among these four measures was .21, which, again, is lower 
than would be anticipated for measures of the same mode of reward 
allocation. The vignette allocations made equally according to 
organizational policy and to managerial preference were highly
correlated (jr» .67, j) < .001), however, both percentage and the 
criteria listed/ranked as equity-related correlated near zero with 
the remaining measures of the equality mode.
At this point it seems relevant to highlight several 
interesting intercorrelations. First, there are several significant 
correlations between some measures of the equity and equality modes. 
For example, the equity-related and equality-related criteria 
listed/ranked as important in the pay increase decision were 
significantly correlated (£» .35, j> < .001). Furthermore,
significant correlations were found among vignette allocations made 
equally and equitably. Specifically, allocations made equitably 
according to organizational policy correlated significantly with 
allocations made equally according to both organizational policy (jr« 
.91, j) < .001) and managerial preference (r- .61, j) < .001). Also, 
allocations made equally according to organizational policy were 
significantly related to allocations made equitably according to
managerial preference (jr» .60, £  <..001). Finally, equitable and
equal allocations made according to managerial preference were also 
significantly correlated (r- .87, j)< .001). As can be seen, the
correlations between the measures of the equity and equality modes 
are much higher than the correlations within each of these modes.
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Second, there were significant negative correlations between 
some of the measures of equality and equity inodes and the need mode. 
For example, the vignette allocations made based on need according to 
managerial preference were related negatively to allocations made 
both equitably (r■« -.19, £  < .05) and equally (_r* -.20, _£ < .05)
according to organizational policy, and with allocations made 
equitably according to managerial preference (r^ - -.28, 
j) < .001). However, there was a significant relationship between the 
vignette allocation made according to a managerial preference to 
consider employee need (r* .26, j) C.01) and the descriptive statement 
of the last pay increase decision as equity-based.
Third, with respect to the measures of the need mode of reward 
allocation, there was a significant relationship found between the 
vignette allocations made based on organizational policy and those 
made based on managerial preferences to consider employee need (_r« 
. 64 , j> < .001) .
Finally, the two measures of a combination or other mode of 
reward allocation did not correlate with each other. However, one 
combination/other mode measure, the descriptive statement of the last 
allocation as having been made according to a combination of modes, 
correlated negatively and significantly with allocations made 
equitably according to organizational policy (_r* -.22, j) < .01) and 
with those made according to managerial preference (r^ - -.23, j) <
.01), as may be anticipated.
In conclusion, there appeared to be significant correlations 
among a number of the equity, equality, need and other/combination
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mode measures. While the most clear cut among these relationships 
were between the equity and equality mode measures, the remainder of 
the intercorrelations among the different modes were less consistent. 
Organizational Variables
Table 9 displays the correlations obtained for the 
relationships between the organizational variables of interest and 
the measures of the mode of reward allocation. Thus, all necessary 
data for Hypotheses 1, 1A, IB, 1C, and 2 are provided in Table 9. 
Measures of each mode of reward allocation have been defined in 
detail in the discussion of intercorrelations between measures of the 
modes of reward allocation earlier in the results section of this 
paper,
Organizational goals for the pay increase. Hypothesis 1 and 
its three subhypotheses predicted that the organizational goal for 
the pay increase will influence the manager's choice of reward 
allocation mode. Contrary to predictions of Hypothesis 1A, no 
relationshihp was found between the organizational goal of rewarding 
performance and any of the measures of the equity mode of reward 
allocation. For Hypothesis 1A it was expected that at least larger 
correlations would result between the organizational goal of 
rewarding performance and the measures of the equity mode than with 
other modes. As can be seen in Table 9, however, the relationships 
between this organizational goal and measures of each of the other 
modes were only once slightly greater than the relationship with the 
equity mode, and were near zero for the remaining relationships.
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Due to reasons explained in the method section of this paper, 
insufficient responses for the item measuring the organizational goal 
of rewarding cooperative and harmonious work relationships prohibited 
testing of Hypothesis IB. Finally, as can be seen in Table 9, the 
relationships between multiple organizational goals and either of the 
two measures of combination modes of reward allocation were non­
significant. In fact no relationship between this organizational 
goal and any of the measures of reward modes appeared different from 
zero.
In summary, no support has been found for Hypothesis 1. 1
Pay increase budget. Neither the pay increase budget change 
nor the pay increase budget variance correlated with any of the 
measures of the mode of reward allocation. Thus, there was no 
support for Hypothesis 2, that pay increase budget fluctuations are 
related to the chosen mode of reward allocation.
Managerial Variables
Table 10 displays correlations obtained for the relationships 
between the managerial variables of interest and the measures of the 
mode of reward allocation. Thus, all necessary data for Hypotheses 
3A, 3B, 3C, and U are provided in Table 10. Again, measures of each
mode of reward allocation have been defined in detail earlier in the 
results section of this paper.
Managerial goals for pay increases. Hypothesis 3 and its three 
subhypotheses predicted that the managerial goal of the pay increase 
will influence the manager's choice of reward allocation mode. 
Hypothesis 3A, predicting that equity will be the manager's choice of
Table 10
Correlations of Managerial Variables and Pleasures of ttie Mode of Reward AlIo<Btion
Managerial Goals 
Reward Performance Multiple Goals
-‘:'dc used in last pay increase
1. Percentage .00 -.11
Criteria listed/ranked
A. equity -.10 .10
B. Equality - . 2 3 * *  .23**
C. Need ,05 -.05
D. Other/Combination -.07 .07
5. Descriptive statements
A. Equity ,18* -.18*
3. Combination -.17* .17*
Actual allocation mode
4. Organisational policy
A, Equity ,00 .00
3. Equality .04 -.04
C. Need .09 -.09
5. Managerial preferences
A. Equity ,08 -.08
9. ..quality .15 -.15
C. Need .16 -.02
* p <.05
** p<.0l
Managerial Criteria 
Employee Inputs
-.05
-.05
.08 
.02 
. .10
-.05
.08
-.08
- . 0 1
-.05
-.15
-.08
-.05
L n
'-j
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allocation mode when individual performance is the main goal, was 
supported with a significant correlation between the managerial goal 
of rewarding high performance and the descriptive statement of the 
last pay increase as equitable. However, relationships between this 
goal and other measures of the equity mode were all near zero. 
Additional support of Hypothesis 3A is provided by a significant 
negative correlation found between the managerial goal of rewarding 
performance and equality-based criteria which were listed/ranked as 
important to the manager in pay increase decisions -.23, j> <
.0 1).
Once again, as explained in the method section of this paper, 
insufficient responses for the item representing a managerial goal 
for the pay increase of rewarding cooperative and harmonious work 
relationships prohibited a meaningful test of Hypothesis 3B. 
Hypothesis 3C stated that multiple managerial goals would lead to a 
choice of allocation mode other than equity. Multiple managerial 
goals for the pay increase correlated significantly with the type of 
criteria, equality-related criteria, on which the manager placed the 
most importance (_r- .23), as well as with the descriptive statement 
of the last pay increase decision being made using a combination of 
modes (jr» .17), offering support for Hypothesis 3C. However, no 
other relationships between multiple managerial goals and other modes 
of reward allocation were far from zero.
In conclusion, the findings indicate that there appears to be 
some influence of the managerial goals for the reward allocation on
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the manager's choice of reward allocation mode, thus partially
2
supporting Hypothesis 3.
Managerial criteria for pay increases. The importance which 
managers placed on the criteria related to employee job inputs was 
not significantly related to any measure of the equity mode of reward 
allocation. These findings do not offer support for Hypothesis 4, 
that managers who place importance on performance-related criteria in 
pay increase decisions tend to choose equity as their mode of reward 
allocation.
Interaction of Managerial and Organizational Variables
The results of the stepwise regression analyses to test the 
relative importance of the different managerial and organizational 
variables in determining the mode of reward allocation are presented 
in Tables 11 through 18. All models were tested with two
combinations of variables. First, all independent variables were 
input into each model. Missing data for the variables age, sex, 
budget change, and budget variance, and the dependent measures of the 
self-report criteria considered to be important in reward allocation 
decisions were replaced with the mean score for each of these 
variables. Second, these models were retested without the corrected 
dependent variables. Results for all models except two, the equity 
mode as measured by the criteria listed/ranked by the managers and 
the other/combination mode as measured by criteria listed/ranked by 
the managers, were identical for these two types of analyses. For 
these equity and other/combination mode measures, the only models 
which were significant involved corrected dependent variables. The
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results of these analyses will be discussed by mode of reward 
allocation.
Equity mode of reward allocation. There were five measures of
the equity mode, as discussed earlier in the results section of this
paper. Hence, five stepwise regression models were tested. Of these
five models, two yielded significant results. The first significant
model predicted the equity mode as measured using the self-reported
listing/ranking of performance-related criteria important in pay
increase decisions (See Table 11). When this measure was employed
the two significant predictors were pay increase budget change and
2
the sex of the manager (li * .10). As previously noted this model 
involved corrected dependent variables. Because use of this
procedure relies on the assumption of randomness of occurrence of 
missing values, the results must be interpreted with caution. The 
second significant model predicted the mode of equity as measured 
using the manager's description of the last pay increase decision as 
equity-based (See Table 12). When this measure was employed the two 
significant predictors were the manager's perception of the
employee's deservingness of the pay increase and the manager's
2
motivational beliefs consistent with reinforcement theory (li - .14).
In conclusion, equitable reward allocations were best predicted 
by the importance which the manager places on how deserving the 
employee is of a pay increase, the manager's belief in motivating 
employees using reinforcement principles, pay increase budget changes 
and the sex of the manager.
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Table 11
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial
q
Variables and Equity
Step Variable R2 A R2 Final
regression weights*1
1 Pay increase budget 
change
.06 .06 .03
2 Sex of manager . 10 .04 -.27
Equity is measured using the self-reported listing/ranking of 
performance-related criteria important in pay increase decisions, 
k Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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Table 12
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial
g
Variables and Equity-
Step Variable R2 A R 2 Final
• u* bregression weights
1 Employee deservingness 
Managerial
. 11 .11 -.04
2 Motivational beliefs 
Reinforcement
. 14
mO
* .21
g
Equity is measured using the manager's description of the last pay 
increase decision as equity-based
^ Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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Equality mode of reward allocation. There were four measures 
of the equality mode, as described earlier in this results section. 
Hence, four stepwise regression models were tested. Of these four 
models, two yielded significant results. The first significant model 
measured equality using the self-reported listing/ranking of equality- 
related criteria important in pay increase decisions (See Table 13).
When this measure was employed, the only significant predictor of the
2
mode of equity was the managerial goal of rewarding performance (_R = 
.05) .
The second significant model measured equality using
allocations made equally according to organizational policy (See
Table 14). The two predictors when using this measure of equality
were the importance which the organization places on employee inputs
and the importance managers place on employee inputs (e.g.,
2
performance, effort, etc.) (j? - .09). In examining the variances
accounted for by each of the two predictors in this model, it can be
seen that the second variable which entered, managerial emphasis on
employee inputs, accounts for slightly greater variance than the
2
first variable entered (j? ■ .05), organizational emphasis on
2
employee inputs (R^  - .04). This finding is not consistent with the 
expected pattern of decreasing proportions of variance accounted for 
by succeeding variables added to the stepwise regression model. 
Cohen and Cohen (1975) have explained that while suppressor variables 
are uncommon in practice, they may occur when the independent
variables are highly correlated. In such a case a variable which
2
would not make a significant contribution to the _R may be
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Table 13
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial 
Variables and Equality—
Step Variable R2 A  R2 Final
. bregression weights
1 Managerial goals - 
Reward performance
.05 .05 -.93
Equality is measured using the self-reported 1 isting/ranking of 
equality-related criteria important in pay increase decisions.
^ Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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Table 14
0
Variables and Equality
Step Variables R2 A R2 Final
regression weights^
1 Employee Inputs- .04 .04 35.05
Organizational
2 Employee inputs- .09 .05 -24. 12
Managerial
Equality is measured using allocations made equally according to 
organizational policy.
k Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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significant in conjunction with another variable. Therefore, in
order to investigate the possibility of suppressor variable effects
in this model, two points were examined. First, to determine the
amount of variance accounted for by the second variable in predicting
the equality mode, this independent variable, the manager's emphasis
on employee inputs, was regressed onto the dependent measure of the
equality mode as measured using allocations made equally according to
organizational policy. The results of this analysis indicated that,
alone, the variance accounted for by this independent variable in
2
predicting the equality mode was near zero (JR ■ .001). This figure 
is exceedingly less than the proportion of variance accounted for by
the first variable which entered in the stepwise regression model
2
(R_ = .04). This indicates that the two variables may be interacting
to account for a greater proportion of variance than would the second 
variable alone. Second, examination of the correlations between the 
two independent variables revealed a significant correlation between 
the two independent variables in the stepwise regression model (r^  ■
.68, j) < .001). This finding, coupled with the results of the
regression performed using the managerial emphasis on employee inputs 
suggest the possibility that managerial emphasis on employee inputs, 
the second variable in the stepwise regression model, was acting as a 
suppressor variable.
In conclusion, the equality mode was predicted best by a 
managerial goal to reward high performance, and, when considered in 
conjunction,organizational and managerial emphasis on performance- 
related criteria in the pay increase decision.
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Need mode of reward allocation. There were two measures of the
need mode of reward allocation, as described earlier in the results
section. Both of these measures yielded significant models. The
first model employed the measure of the need mode as allocations made
according to organizational policy to consider employee need in pay
increase decisions. As can be seen in Table 15, using this measure
only one predictor was significant, the manager's emphasis on
2
referent others' pay levels (_R = .03).
The second significant model measured need using allocations 
made according to managerial preferences for considering employee 
need in pay increases. As can be seen in Table 16, the two best 
predictors in this model were an organizational emphasis on employee
deservingness, and the manager's motivational belief corresponding to
2
reinforcement theory (_R = .07). Interestingly, the findings of this
stepwise regression are once again inconsistent with the expected
pattern of decreasing proportions of variance accounted for as
successive variables are added into the model. As in the similar
situation for one of the equality mode models, the possibility of
suppressor variable was investigated by considering two points.
First, the second variable which entered into the model, managerial
motivational beliefs in reinforcement theory, was regressed onto the
dependent measure of the need mode as measured by allocations made
according to managerial preference for considering employee need in
pay increase decisions. The results of this analysis indicated that
a smaller proportion of variance was accounted for by this variable 
2
(j? = .029) than that accounted for by the first variable which
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Table 15
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial 
Variables and Need
Step Variables R2 4 R 2 Final
• u* bregression weights
1 Managerial criteria- .03 .03 -3.15
Referent others' pay
levels
Need is measured by allocations made according to organizational 
policy to consider employee need in pay increase decisions, 
k Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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Table 16
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial 
Variables and Need
Step Variables R2 A R 2 Final
regression weights*1
1 Employee deservingness- 
Organizational
.03 .033 6.46
2 Motivational beliefs- 
Reinforcement
ro
* .034 54.86
Need was measured by allocations made according to managerial 
preference for considering employee need in pay increase decisions.
^ Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
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2
entered into the stepwise regression model (ji » .034). While the 
difference is not great, it indicates that the two variables may be 
acting together to account for a small porportion of variance in the 
stepwise regression model. Second, the correlations between the two 
independent variables was nonsignificant (£- .10), indicating that 
high intercorrelation between predictor variables is not a problem in 
this case. Nonetheless, while the difference here between these 
proportions of variance accounted for in the stepwise regression 
model is slight (.001), these findings suggest that the second 
variable which entered the stepwise regression model, managerial 
motivational beliefs consistent with reinforcement theory, may be 
acting as a suppressor variable. In conclusion, the need
allocation mode was best predicted by an emphasis on referent others' 
pay levels, and, when considered together, the organization's 
emphasis on the employee's deservingness and the manager's 
motivational belief in reinforcement theory principles.
Other/Combination modes of reward allocation. There were two
measures of other/combination modes of reward allocation, as
discussed earlier in the results section. Both of these models
yielded significant results. The first model measured the
other/combination mode using the manager's description of the last
pay increase as made according to a combination of equity and
equality modes (See Table 17). Using this measure, the
other/combination mode was predicted by the importance which the
2
manager placed on the criterion of employee deservingness (Ji ■■
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Table 17
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial 
Variables and Other/Combination Modes
Step Variables AR^ Final
■ b regression weights
1 Employee deservingness- .09 .09 .04
Managerial
Combination mode is measured using the manager's description of the 
last pay increase decision as having been made according to a 
combination of equity and equality modes.
^ Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
72
.09). The second model measured a combination of modes using self-
reported listing/rankings of criteria not solely related to equity,
equality, or need which are considered important in pay increase
decisions (See Table 18). As previous1y noted this model involved
corrected dependent variables. Because use of this procedure relies
on the assumption of randomness of occurrence of missing values, the
results must be interpreted with caution. The single best predictor
in this model was the number of years which a manager has been in his
2
or her current position (II = .04).
Additional findings of interest
A number of additional findings for which specific hypotheses 
have not been made may be of interest to the reader, and will be
briefly highlighted. With respect to organizational variables, pay 
secrecy and organizational criteria for pay increases appear to be 
related (See Table 7). It appears that there is a greater tendency 
toward total pay secrec y in organ i zat i ons where greater
organizational emphasis is placed on employee inputs (e.g., 
performance, effort, etc.) (^r=.21, £  < .05), and on how deserving the 
employee is of the pay increase with respect to the amount of the 
employee's last pay increase and cost of living (jr = .22, £  .01).
With regard to managerial variables the following findings 
resulted. It appears that the managers with pay increase goals of 
rewarding performance also held motivational beliefs consistent with 
equity theory (_r= .17, £  < .05). Furthermore, managers with multiple 
goals for pay increases were more likely to hold motivational beliefs 
consistent with reinforcement theory (r= .21, £  ^ .05).
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Table 18
Stepwise Regression Results for Organizational and Managerial 
Variables and Other/Combination Modes
Step Variables 6 Final
• kf bregression weights
1 Years in current .04 .04 -.03
position
Other/Combination mode is measured using self-reported 
listing/ranking of criteria important in pay increase decisions which 
are considered to be not solely related to equity, equality, or need.
k Reported regression weights are unstandardized.
Discussion
Discussion of the findings of the present study will be 
presented as follows. First, the results of the tests of the 
hypothesized relationships between specific variables in the portion 
of the model which was examined will be discussed. This section will 
be divided into two subsections: (a) organizational variables, and
(b) managerial variables. This will be followed by an overview of 
the findings of the stepwise regression analyses. Limitations of the 
study will then be discussed, followed by theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings. Finally, directions for future
research will be suggested.
Tests of the Relationships Between Specific Variables in the Model
Organizational variables. Several hypotheses were tested with 
respect to two organizational variables: organizational goals for
the pay increase and pay increase budget fluctuations. The findings 
for these hypotheses will now be discussed.
The first major hypothesis, that the organizational goal for 
the reward allocation will influence the manager's choice of 
allocation mode, was not supported. This hypothesis included three 
more specific subhypotheses. Subhypothesis 1A stated that equity is 
expected to be the managers's choice of allocation mode when reward 
of performance is the main organizational goal. The results of this 
study indicated that the organizational goal of rewarding performance 
did not lead managers to choose the equity mode of reward allocation 
any more often than the other modes. However, in a laboratory study
74
75
Landau and Leventhal (1976) found that rewards were distributed 
equitably when the goal of retaining high performers was clearly 
stated to allocators. One possible reason for these differences in 
results may be that the organizational goals were more clearly stated 
in the laboratory setting (Landau & Leventhal, 1976) than in the 
organizational setting used in this research. Furthermore, other 
differences between laboratory and field settings, (e.g., the 
personal importance of the allocation decision to allocators), may 
have influenced these differences in results.
Subhypothesis IB stated that equality will be the manager's 
choice of allocation mode when organizational effectiveness is 
dependent upon cooperative and harmonious work relationships. Due to 
what appears to be a problem of range restriction in responses to the 
organizational goal item, Deutsch's (1975) and Leventhal's (1976b) 
suggested influence of an organizational goal for cooperative and 
harmonious work relationships on the manager's choice of the equality 
mode could not be tested. However, we still do not know why managers 
did not tend to perceive cooperative and harmonious work 
relationships as an organizational goal for pay increases. As 
discussed under Subhypothesis 1A, one possible reason for this may be 
that the organizational goals were stated more clearly in the 
laboratory setting (e.g., Landau & Leventhal, 1976), than in the 
organizational setting used in this research. Furthermore, other 
differences between laboratory and field settings (e.g. , the personal 
importance of the allocation decision to the manager), may have 
influenced these differences in results. On the other hand, perhaps
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the organizations examined in this study truly did not advocate
rewarding positive work relationships, instead stressing reward of 
employee performance. Therefore, what appeared to be a problem of 
range restriction in responses to this item may simply have been a 
reflection of actual pay increase goals in these organizations.
Finally, Subhypothesis 1C stated that when multiple goals 
become salient, a mode other than strict equity will be preferred. 
However, when faced with multiple organizational goals for pay
increases, managers did not appear to choose a reward allocation mode 
other than strict equity, which is inconsistent with the findings of 
previous research (e.g., Greenberg, 1978b). In fact, managers
reporting multiple organizational goals for the pay increase did not 
favor any mode over others. Again, how clearly organizational goals 
are stated may influence how salient these goals are to managers and 
may, therefore, influence the effects of the goals on the choice of 
reward allocation mode. Particularly, when an organization has 
mult i pie pay increase goals which are not clearly stated, a manager 
may be even more confused about what the organization's goals are 
really are.
In conclusion, the findings for these three subhypotheses 
indicate that the organizational goal for the pay increase did not
influence the manager's choice of reward allocation mode. 
Alternatively, how clearly stated and how salient the organizational 
goals were may have determined their influence on choice of reward 
allocation mode. For example, in the laboratory studies, there was 
greater control over the emphasis on and subjects' understanding of
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reward allocation goals. Perhaps the organizations used in this 
study had not made their pay increase goals clear enough or salient 
to the managers. This could account for the lack of influence of 
organizational pay increase goals on the reward allocation mode 
choice.
The second major hypothesis tested in this study stated that 
the fluctuation of the pay increase budget will influence the choice 
of mode of reward allocation. Effects of the pay increase budget 
fluctuations on the choice of reward allocation mode were not 
indicated, which is inconsistent with earlier research involving 
oversufficiency, sufficiency, and undersufficiency of reward funds 
(e.g., Lane & Messe, 1972). One major difference between the present 
study and previous research, however, was the reward allocation 
situation. In the present study managers divided rewards only among 
subordinates, while in laboratory studies the allocators included 
themselves in the allocation of rewards. However, in the
organizations studied in the present research, no managers included 
themselves in the reward allocation. It appears from these findings 
that, due to the reward allocation situation in the laboratory study 
just described, the results cannot be generalized to a field setting 
in which the reward allocation situation is not the same. Another 
possible explanation for the lack of effects of pay increase budget 
fluctuations on choice of reward allocation mode lies in the limited 
time span considered in the study. Perhaps limiting the evaluation 
of pay increase budget fluctuations to only the two or three most 
recent years distorted the amount of variance which may have truly
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existed. Therefore, the absence of effects of these fluctuations on 
the mode choice may be misleading.
Managerial variables. Several hypotheses were tested with 
respect to two managerial variables: managerial goals for the pay
increase and managerial criteria for the pay increase. The findings 
for these hypotheses will now be discussed.
The third major hypothesis of this study, that the managerial 
goal of the reward allocation will influence the manager's choice of 
mode of reward allocation, was partially supported. This hypothesis 
included three more specific subhypotheses.
Subhypothesis 3A stated that equity is expected to be the 
manager's choice of allocation mode when reward of individual
performance is the main managerial goal. Consistent with previous
research (Landau & Leventhal, 1976), it appears that managers with a 
pay increase goal of rewarding high performance tended to describe 
their last pay increase decision as equity-based. This finding
supports Subhypothesis 3A. However, it is interesting to note that 
this finding was not significant for all measures of the equity mode. 
For example, while managers with a goal of rewarding performance 
described their last pay increase decision as equity based, this goal 
did not influence their vignette allocations. The salience of 
managers' goals may play a part in determining this relationship. It 
is quite conceivable that managers, before completing the 
questionnaire used in this study, were not cognizant of a personal 
"goal," per se, for the pay increase. Consequently, when a choice 
concerning goals had to be made, they may have chosen the one which
79
they perceived to be the organization's goal, (e.g, reward high 
performance), regardless of how truly representative it was of their 
personal goals. Thus, managers may have, in retrospect, perceived 
their allocations to be based on equity, yet in actual vignette 
allocations used a mode other than equity.
Subhypothesis 3B stated that equality will be the chosen 
allocation mode when cooperative and harmonious work relationships 
are important to work group effectiveness. Due to what appears to be 
a problem of range restriction in responses to the managerial goal 
item, Deutsch's (1975) and Leventhal's (1976b) suggestion that a 
managerial goal for cooperative and harmonious work relationships 
will lead to a choice of the equality mode could not be tested. Very 
few managers perceived this to be their central goal in pay 
increases, resulting in range restriction on this item. As with the 
organizational goal for rewarding cooperative and harmonious work 
relationships, it is unclear why more managers did not choose 
equality as a central goal. However, significant correlations 
between organizational goals and managerial goals for pay increases 
suggest that managers agree with organizational goals for pay 
increases. This may explain why managers did not view reward of 
cooperative and harmonious work relationships as their central pay 
increase goal. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that 
managers truly do not perceive reward of cooperative and harmonious 
work relationships to be their central pay increase goal. In either 
case, what appears to be a problem of range restriction in responses
80
to this item may simply be a true reflection of pay increase goals 
among financial institution managers.
Subhypothesis 3C stated that when multiple goals become 
salient, a mode other than strict equity will be preferred. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Greenberg, 1978b), managers 
with multiple goals for the pay increase chose a reward allocation 
mode other than strict equity. Specifically, managers with multiple 
pay increase goals tended to list/rank equality-related criteria as 
important in pay i nc rease dec i sions and/or describe thei r 1ast pay 
increase decision as based on a combination of reward allocation 
modes. However, multiple goals for the pay increase had no effect on 
vignette allocations. Again the salience of a manager's goals may 
play a part in determining which mode is chosen. While a manager may 
be able to acknowledge multiple pay increase goals, for a given pay 
increase decision situational factors may cause one goal to be more 
salient than others. Past pay increase decisions may have, thus, 
been influenced by situational factors. The vignette allocations, 
which are less problematic with regard to demand characteristics, 
cannot, however, provide situational information which would normally 
be available in actual pay increase decisions.
In conclusion, the hypothesis that the managerial goal of the 
reward allocation will influence the manager's choice of mode of 
reward allocation was partially supported. It appears that for the 
allocation mode measures involving recall of past pay increase 
decisions or recall of criteria which would be considered important
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in pay increase decisions, managerial pay increase goals did have an 
influence on reward mode choice. However, vignette allocations were 
not affected by these goals. The salience of managerial pay increase 
goals may be an influencing factor in this relationship between pay 
increase goals and reward mode choice.
The fourth major hypothesis stated that managers who weight 
performance based criteria most heavily will choose equity as an 
allocation mode more frequently than equality or need. Effects of 
managerial criteria for the pay increase on the choice of reward 
allocation mode were not found, which is inconsistent with other 
studies which have indicated equity as the chosen mode when the
criteria are performance-related (e.g., Fossum & Fitch, 1985). 
Managers in this study who weighted employee inputs to the
organization most heavily did not have a preference for equity or any
other mode of reward allocation. One possible explanation for this
finding lies in the strong positive correlation between managerial
emphasis and organizational emphasis on employee job inputs (j>= .68,
jK .001). Managers may have reported a personal emphasis on these
criteria because they felt the organization emphasized their 
importance. Therefore, it is possible that if the managers did not 
personally view these criteria as most important, the influence of 
these criteria on the choice of reward allocation mode would have 
been lessened. A second possible explanation lies in the influence 
of situational factors. That is, even though managers may generally
consider employee job inputs to be the most important criteria in pay 
increase decisions, these criteria may have less influence on the
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choice of reward allocation mode as different situational factors
become salient.
Stepwise Regressions Testing the Interaction of Organizational and 
Managerial Variables
Since there were a number of measures for each mode of reward 
allocation, stepwise regressions were performed using each measure as 
a dependent variable. Ideally, the same or similar combinations of 
variables would predict the different measures of the same mode. 
However, this was not the case for any reward allocation mode.
First, use of the equity mode was predicted by two totally 
dissimilar sets of predictor variables. Since the two measures of 
the equity mode in question were significantly correlated (_r= .16,
< .01), one would expect similar patterns of predictor variables.
However, while the correlation is significant, it is still much lower 
than would be hoped, and may explai n the nonsimilar patterns of 
predictor variables. Furthermore, one set of predictors must be 
interpreted with caution. The missing values for one set of
independent variables were replaced with the mean scores for the 
variables, and may therefore overestimate their importance in the 
model. Conservatively, it may be wiser to place more emphasis on the 
model based on only uncorrected values, which indicated that the best 
predictors of the equity mode were managerial perceptions of employee
deservingness of the pay increase and managerial beliefs which were
consistent with reinforcement theory.
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Second, two sets of predictors of the equality mode resulted 
which would theoretically be expected to predict use of the equity 
mode rather than the equality mode. Strong intercorrelations between 
measures of the equity and equality inodes may partially explain this 
result. It may be that equal and equitable allocations were both 
preferred allocations, and some other variable which was not included 
in this analysis determined the manager's choice of the equality 
mode. Another possible explanation for this relationship may be that 
is was difficult for managers to distinguish between equity and 
equality modes.
Third, two totally different sets of variables predicted use of 
the need mode. The two measures of the need mode in question were 
significantly correlated (_r- .64, _g< .001), and would have been
expected to have been predicted by a similar constellation of 
variables. However, the two sets of predictor variables were not
correlated with each other. Apparently, the measures of the need
mode, although significantly correlated, did not correlate highly 
enough. Furthermore, the low number of managers who chose the need 
mode may have limited the power of this analysis.
Fourth, and finally, two totally different sets of variables 
predicted use of the other/combination mode. However, the missing
values for one set of predictor variables were replaced with the mean
scores for the values and may, therefore, overestimate their 
importance in the model. Thus the results of this model must be 
interpreted with caution. Conservatively, it may be wiser to place 
more emphasis on the results of the model based only on uncorrected
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values, which found that the best predictor of the other/combination 
mode was managerial perceptions of an employee's deservingness for a 
pay increase.
Limitations of the Present Research
The most important set of concerns involves measurement of the 
reward allocation inodes. First, the intercorrelations within each 
reward mode were disappointingly low overall. Since all of the mode 
measures were developed by the researcher and, therefore, this was
the first time the measures had been used in a field study, there is
clearly room for methodological improvement in measurement of the 
modes. Furthermore, the correlations between the equity and equality 
mode measures were very high. The measure of the modes which 
involved listing/ranking criteria important in pay increase decisions 
was designed so that managers could place equal importance on 
criteria in both the equity and equality categories. Therefore, it 
is conceivable that managers could have relied fairly heavily on both 
modes when making pay increase decisions. Greater distinction 
between these modes would allow clearer understanding of the effects 
of predictor variables on each of these modes independently. 
Finally, the realism of the vignettes was limited. Managers made 
allocations with very little information about the four employees, 
and without having had any normal interactions with them. However,
since access to actual pay increase figures is virtually impossible
the vignette allocations are the closest approximation of how actual 
allocations are made.
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Also, the present study relied solely upon self-report 
measures. Since the study was based on managers' perceptions and 
decision making processes, most parts of the questionnaire lacked
objectivity and verifiability. It may have been useful to have 
objective measures of organizational variables for comparison with 
how managers perceived these organizational variables. This 
information may have helped to explain some of the findings.
Additionally, range restriction appeared to be a problem in a 
number of items. However, one can only speculate at this point as to 
what extent the range restriction problem or a reflection of reality 
in organizations. For example, did very few of the managers choose 
the equality mode because it was not perceived to be a realistic 
option in organizations, or was the sample used actually exclusive of 
organizations which may encourage or allow use of the equality mode? 
By increasing the sample size and adding a variety of different types 
of organizations the extent of the range restriction problem may be 
clarified.
Furthermore, the limitations of the use of stepwise regression 
must be acknowledged. The stepwise regression procedure allows for
entry of a number of variables, allowing statistical criteria to 
determine the relative importance and, thus, the order of entry of 
each variable. Stepwise regression capitalizes on chance error and 
relies on overfitting of data. Also, when interpreting stepwise
regressions one must be aware that while several variables considered
2
together may increase the , any one of these variables alone may
not add a significant proportion of variance accounted for. One
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advantage of stepwise regression, and the reason it was chosen for 
use in this study, is its capacity for model-building (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1983). The procedure allows for synthesis of an array of 
research findings. Thus, the results of the stepwise regression 
analyses are perhaps best viewed at providing a basis for future 
research using Freedman and Montanari's (1980) reward allocation 
m o d e l .
Finally, the generalizabi1ity of the results of the present 
study must be discussed. The geographic diversity of the sample adds 
to the generalizability of the study across financial institutions. 
However, responses were obtained only from managers in financial 
institutions, and may differ from those of managers in different 
types of organizations. This factor should be considered if present 
findings are applied to other groups.
Theoretical and Applied Significance of the Findings
Theoretical significance. The present findings provide 
preliminary support for the importance of organizational variables 
and managerial variables in Freedman and Montanari's (1980)
managerial reward allocation model. Only one of the hypothesized 
relationships between a single variable and the choice of reward 
allocation mode was supported, that is, the relationship involving 
managerial pay increase goals. However, when considered
simultaneously, managerial and organizational variables interacted to 
influenced the choice of reward allocation mode. A major part of 
Freedman and Montanari’s (1980) model was the effects of the
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interrelationships between the antecedent variables, i.e., managerial 
and organizational variables, on the choice of reward allocation
mode. Therefore, while the relationships between single variables 
and the allocation modes were not strong in the present research, the 
finding that the variables interacted to influence the reward 
allocation mode choice support one major part of Freedman and 
Montanari's (1980) proposed model. However, of the array of
antecedent variables which were possible predictors of reward 
allocation modes, never were there over two significant predictors in 
any one model.
The findings also indicated that, with regard to the measures 
of the reward allocation modes, theory is ahead of measurement 
technology. First, within the measures which were constructed for 
each mode, the correlations were disappointingly low, indicating a
need to refine measurement of the modes. Second, the correlations
were surprisingly high between measures of the modes of equity and 
equality. This strong relationship may indicate that the constructs 
of equity and equality, although theoretically distinct, may not be 
cognitively separable by subjects, or that the measurement of these 
constructs did not allow for sufficient distinction between the two. 
On the other hand, the two may be distinct, both theoretically and
cognitively, yet each may be the preferred mode depending on the
situation. If so, the need arises for greater theoretical
understanding of situational constraints.
In summary, it appears from a theoretical standpoint that 
while, independently, managerial variables influence the mode choice,
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and when combined, organizational and managerial variables influence 
the mode choice, these relationships cannot be confirmed until 
improvements are made on measurement of the allocation modes.
Applied significance. Several applications in the area of 
managerial reward allocation are suggested by the present findings. 
Because organizational goals for pay increases did not appear to have 
an influence on the choice of reward allocation mode, there may be a 
need for greater emphasis on or explanation of these goals. In 
laboratory studies where subjects were very aware of their goal, the 
effect on allocations was significant (Greenberg, 1978b, Landau & 
Leventhal, 1976). Thus, making organizational goals for pay 
increases more explicit may increase their effect on managers' pay 
increase decisions.
The weak association between managerial emphasis on performance 
based criteria and choice of the equity mode suggests that managers 
either may not be translating their employee evaluations into the 
appropriate reward allocation mode, or their current reward system 
may prohibit use of the appropriate reward allocation mode. In this 
sample, this weak relationship may be due to a recent organizational 
emphasis on performance-based pay increases. T h u s , managers may have 
been aware of the performance-based criteria which their organization 
currently stressed as important, yet the previous reward system with 
which they were familiar did not reflect such an emphasis. The 
applied significance of this is that organizations must ensure that 
the currently employed reward system is reflective of the criteria 
emphasized as important, and is understood by managers. Furthermore,
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once the performance evaluation and reward allocation system are 
linked, managers need to be trained to use the two together. This is 
particularly true if, as in a number of the financial institutions in 
this study, the system is new to managers. This training would also 
afford an opportunity to clarify organizational goals for pay 
increases.
Finally, the results of this study which involved the relative 
importance of different variables in the choice of reward allocation 
mode should allow managers to more fully understand what factors are
influencing their decisions. Awareness of these influences would
allow modifications in reward allocation behavior if necessary. 
Managers who have a clear understanding of the effects of their 
personal biases, values, and opinions on their reward allocation 
decisions will be better able to control these personal factors and, 
consequently, make fairer and more objective reward allocations.
Future Peseorch
While this study provides some support for the contention t h a t , 
when considered together, organizational variables and managerial 
variables affect the allocation mode choice, additional research is 
needed on Freedman and Montanari's (1980) managerial reward 
allocation model. First, since the reward allocation node is the 
variable being predicted, measurement of this variable must be 
addressed. Before any sound conclusions can be made, we must be able
to measure each mode more reliably and perhaps more validly.
Seemingly a first step in this direction would be 
further investigations using the strongest
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reward allocation measure in this study, the descriptive statement of 
the last reward allocation. Furthermore, use of vignettes may prove 
to be as useful as they have been in other studies, such as those 
involving evaluation of responses to employee performance (e.g., 
Green & Llden, 1980; Dobbins & Russell, 1986).
Second, replication of the present study including a greater 
number of respondents would allow further clarification of the 
relationships between the variables in the tested portion of the 
model, and would strengthen the methodology as well.
Third, once the soundness of the methodology and of the model 
itself has been improved, the present study should be replicated, 
first in financial institutions, then in other organizations to 
improve generalizability of the findings.
Finally, the possibility of additional variables which have not 
been included in this model should be considered. For example, there 
is a growing interest in how attributions affect leader-subordinate 
interactions, (e.g., Green & Liden, 1980; Dobbins, Pence, Orban, S 
Sgro, 1983). The effects of managers' attributions on managerial 
reward allocations may be a managerial variable worthy of inclusion 
in the model.
In conclusion, this study involved the test of a portion of 
Freedman and Montanari's (1980) integrative model of managerial 
reward allocations: the influence of managerial variables and
organizational variables on the choice of reward allocation mode. 
Significant effects for hypothesized relationships between single 
variables and reward allocation modes were found only for managerial
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pay increase goals. However, when managerial and organizational 
variables were considered simultaneously, a number o£ significant 
relationships resulted. The interactive effects of these sets of 
variables on the reward allocation mode choice require clarification. 
This can only be achieved if measurement of reward allocation modes 
is refined. Following this advance, additional portions of the model 
will be testable, and specific relationships between all the 
variables can be defined. The end result will be a greater 
understanding of the entire reward allocation process.
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ill D i ' p u r  t t r t n } !  o f  P i i U i h i t l O t f l i
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t i  U n i v l r s i t v  . m< i in\i. ai 1. 1 ‘J
II A K  l\ KOH.I I.OLISIA'vA 7(180' 5 VII
at*, i m i  s. j .
A u g u s t , 1 9 8 6
Dear Manager ;
I a n  a g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  c o m p l e t i n g  rtiy d o c t o r a t e  in 1 n d u s  t r i a l / O r  p a n  i za 1 1 o n a  1 
P s y c h o l o g y  at L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y .  Y o u r  ban! h a s  a g r e e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  
in a s u r v e y  w h i c h  I h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  c o n c e r n i n g  m a n a g e r s ’ p a y  i n c r e a s e  d e c i s i o n s  
ir t he  b a a  L i n g  i n d u s t r y .  A s  n nen.acer i n v o l v e d  in e m p l o y e e  p a y  i n c r e a s e s ,  y o u  
h a v e  b e e n  s e l e c t e d  to  v o l u n t a r i l y  c o m p l e t e  the e n c l o s e d  s u r v e y .
T h i s  s u r v e y  is c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  f a c t o r s  y o u  c o n s i d e r  w h e n  m a k i n g  p 2 \ i n c r e a s e  
d e c i s i o n s .  P l e a s e  t a k e  a few m i n u t e s  to  r e a d  t h r o u g h  a nd  c o m p l e t e  t h e  s u r v e y .  
P e s p o n d  t o  a ll  of t h e  q u e s t i o n s  in  t h e  m a n n e r  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  y o u r  
s i t u a t i o n .  T h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  e a c h  s e c t i o n  of t h e  s u r v e y  a r e  s e l f -  
o p  Inn a lory. In t h e  f i n a l  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  s u r v e y  you a r e  a s k e d  t o  m a k e  pay 
i n c r e a s e  d e c i s i o n s  f or  a f i c t i o n a l  g r o u p  of e m p l o y e e s  u s i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
p r o v i d e d .  k l e a s e  n o t e  t h a t  in n o  p a r t  of  the- s u r v e y  w i l l  y o u  b e  a s k e d  to
d i v u l g e  c o n f i d e n t i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  a c t u a l  d o l l a r  f i g u r e s  f or  a n y  of
y o u r  c ~ p l oj e e s .
L e t  r e  a s s u r e  you t h a t  y o u r  r e s p o n s e s  w i l l  be c o m p l e t e l y  a n o n y m o u s .  k’nen you 
h a v e  c o m p l e t e d  the s u r v e y ,  p l e a s e  d i s c a r d  t h e  f o u r  y e l l o w  p a g e s  ant! t he  c o v e r  
l e tt e r a n d  r e t u r n  o n l y  t h e  p a g e s  n u n b a r e d  o n e  t h r o u g h  f i v e  to  n e  at L o u i s i a n a  
S t a t e  IJnivcisit) in t h e  p r o v i d e d  e n v e l o p e .  L e t u r n  of  t h e  s u r v e y  w i t h i n  o ne 
wee!; to t en  d a y s  w o u l d  be  g r e a t l y  a p p r e c i a t e d .
If y o u  h a v e  a n y  q u e s t i o n s ,  p l e a s e  f e c i f r e e  to  c o n t a c t  m e  a( L . S . D .
1 w o u l d  s i n c e r e l y  a p p r e c i a t e  y o u r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in t h i s  s t u d y .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s .
/
Jeanne M . t'u sse 1 1
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APPENDIX B 
Measures of Organizational Goals for 
Pay Increases
102
Organizational Coals for Far Increases. Organizations may expect various goals 
to be attained through pay increases, Allocate the number of points which 
most appropriately describes the importance which your organization places on 
the following goals for pay increases. The total number of points allocated 
must total seven. It is not necessary to use all three iteos, sc use only the 
itens which apply to your organization.
 1. High performance is the primary concern. Only the best performers art
encouraged to stay with the organization. High performers are 
rewarded with high pay, and low performers with low pB>.
 2. Cooperation among employees is the primary concern. Harmonious
relationships and a lacV of conflict are encouraged so that ell 
employees are motivated to stay with the organization.
 3. My organization has other goals for pay increases which can bet ter tt
described as: (please fill in your organization's goal belov if the
two goals above inadequately describe your organization's goals for 
paj increases).
103
APPENDIX C 
Measures of Pay Secrecy
104
P at Sc;rec > . Pate each of the following items using the acale provided. In 
tote] secret' conditions, your subordinates have no idea what the maximur pa;, 
is for their position or for other positions, when to expect their next raise, 
etc. In individual disclosure conditions, your subordinates know their 
position in the pa\ range for their jobs. In full disclosure situations, your 
subordinates know the pay range for their positions, other positions and other 
employees, when to expect their next raise, etc.
Total Individual Full
Secrecy Disclosure Disclosure
 1. The policv in my organization regarding pay secrecy for icy subordinates isr
2. Among their co-workers, ay subordinates generally practice:
105
APPENDIX D 
Measures of Organizational Criteria for 
Pay Increases
106
Oreani rational Criteria for Fbv Increases. Use the 7-poinl stale to write the 
number which best describes the importance ornariiatlonal p o l i o  places or, ea:h 
of the following 10 criteria In evaluating employees for pa; increases
7-----
Very
lEportsnt
  1 .
  2 .
  3.
  i,
  5.
  6 .
  7.
  8.
  9.
1 0 .
Somewhat
Important
 1
S ot
I m p o r t a n t
Individual employee job performance 
Nature of the employee’s Job 
Amount of effort expended by the employee 
Employee's training and experience
Fey level for comparable positions outside the organization- 
Fay level for comparable positions inside the organisation 
Amount of employee's last pay increase 
Cost of living
Length of service (seniority)
Level of employee's responsibility
107
APPENDIX E 
Measures of Pay Increase Budget
108
y.Jacre ase Budget.
What was the size of your pay increase budget for
1984? _______1
1935? _______X
Please estimate for 1986 '______ %
109
APPENDIX F 
Measures of Organizational Demographics
110
I'hat V0E the dele of the last pay lncreise1 (Approximate)
Ho- often d"' p£j increase: occur in your depar tnen I
  3 r o o t  hr   6 nonthr, ___  12 n o n t h s    O t h e r  (descritc)-.
Approximately how many employees ere in your organisation? ____
Ill
APPENDIX G 
Measures of Managerial Goals for 
Pay Increases
112
Hanerer i a 1 Goa 1 s . You os o manager may have your own Ideas concerning what 
should be accomplished through pay Increases. Allocate the number of points 
which (Dost appropriately describes the importance which t o l  as a mangier place 
on each of the following goals for pay Increases. The total nunber of points 
allocated must total seven. It is not n e r e s s c ;  to use all three items, so 
use only the items which apply to you as a manat’er .
 1. High performance is the primary concern. Only the best performers are
motivated to stay with the organization. High performers are 
rewarded with high pay, end low performers with low pay.
 2. Cooperation among employees is the primary concern. Harmonious
relationships and a lack of conflict are encouraged so that ell 
employees are motivated to stay with the organization.
3. I have other goals for pay increases which I allocate, which are best
described as: (please fill in your goal below if the two goals above
inadequately describe your goals for paj increases).
113
APPENDIX H
Measures of Beliefs About Employee Motivation
114
Belief? about employee motivation. Check only one of the following Staterents
which most closely describes jour beliefs about how jou can best motivate
jour employees through pay Increases,
I believe that in order to motivate my employees as much as possible, r; jet
is tc :
_ _  Do what ] can to enable my subordinates to attain high performance by
offering thetr the salaries which they perceive to be sufficiently higt. 
They most expect that they can reach the performance goal and that they
n i l  receive the expected salary upon attaining the goal.
  Reward high performing subordinates regularly, as quickly as possitle,
end in such a manner that will cause my subordinates to repeat high 
perf orr.ances ,
 __  Maintain pay equity for my subordinates. That is, my subordinates should
feel that their pBy is proportional to their job inputs {e.g., 
seniority, performance, education, etc.), and that other employees’ pay 
is proportionate to their job inputs as well.
115
APPENDIX I 
Measures of Managerial Criteria for 
Pay Increases
116
K a n acenal Criteria lor Pay Increases. Use the 7-point scale to write the 
number which best describes the importance you as a manager place on the 
following 10 criteria in evaluating employees for pay increases.
7- - - - - - - 1-------- 5-------- C- - - - - - - - - 3- - - - - - - - 2-------- 1
Very Somewhat Net
Important Important Important
  1. Individual employee job performance
  2. Nature of the employee's job
  3, Amount of effort expended by the employee
  Employee's training and experience
  5. Pe\ levels for comparable positions outside the organize*, let
  t. Pay levels for comparable positions inside the organi2atic-.
  7. Amount of employee’s last pay increase
  6. Cost of living
  9, Length of service (seniority)
  10. Level of employee's responsibility
117
APPENDIX J 
Measures of Managerial Demographics
118
General Information
Age:__  Highest educational level attained:
  High school diploma
Set; H F _ _  Associate/technical degree
  Some college
College degree 
___ Some graduate training
  Master'a degree
   Ph.D. degree
ho. ra .) sulordinates did you consider for a pay increase"'
Hou many years have you held your current position: 
What is your position in the organiiatlon?
In ho^ many employees’ pay raise decisions are you involved?_
I w V *  pav increase derisions for; __  officers exe^rt  neo-eve*:'*.
employees ertlcye-i
119
APPENDIX K
Measures of Dollar Amounts of Pay Increases
120
Plecrrc read each of the following questions and respond to the' in tht rp, 
pr o d d e d  in as much detail as necessary. Consider the last pay increas; 
which you rede for your employees when responding to these questionr .
''"hat were the greatest end least dollar amount s of salary increases which 
allocated'1 S_____  - greatest S_ _ _ _ _ _  - least
c t
1 C'~
121
APPENDIX L
Listings/Rankings of Criteria Considered Important
in Pay Increases
122
Pleese list the criteria which you considered in allocating pe> incrces 
your e ~ f ' ]o i ee t . A 1 & c , please rani the inportonce of the criteria c ^  i : • 
lirt. it ( rort ]",'rru’ I Leinp rarV.ed "1."
E t O  
> C J
123
APPENDIX M
Rating Form for Independent Raters for Listings/Rankings 
of Criteria for Pay Increase Decisions
124
1D\:______
1. T Q U I T V  w i l l  b e  t h e  node o f  Bllocation when t h e  e m p l o y e e  is compensated or 
v a l u e d  m o s t  for h i s / h e r  j o b  i n p u t s .  J o b  i n p u t s  include m o s t  primarily j ob  
performance, a s  w e l l  a s  education, l e n g t h  o f  s e r v i c e  to  organization, abil ity . 
s h i l l ,  a n d  h o w  m u c h  c o n t r o l  t h e  p e r s o n  h a s  o v e r  j o b  i n p u t s  ( e . g . ,  exerted effort).
T h e  c r i t e r i a  l i s t e d  by  t h e  m a n a g e r  t o  b e  i m p o r t a n t  f or  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in a n 
e m p l o y e e ' s  p a y / s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e  w e r e  r e l a t e d  to  e q u i t y :
1 2 3 A 5 6 7
n o t  at a l l  s o m e w h a t  v e r y  m u c h
2. E Q U A L I T Y  w i l l  be t h e  m o d e  of a l l o c a t i o n  w h e n  t h e  m a n a g e r  w a n t s  to  m a i n t a i n  
h a r m o n i o u s  r e l a t i o n s  a n d  s o l i d a r i t y  a m o n g  g r o u p  m e m b e r s .  A c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d
a 1 a 11 o c a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  p r e f e r r e d .
T h e  c r i t e r i a  l i s t e d  by t h e  m a n a g e r  t o  be i m p o r t a n t  f or  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in an 
e m p l o y e e ' s  p a y / s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e  w e r e  r e l a t e d  to  e q u a l i t y
1 2  3 A S G 7
n o t  a I a ll  s o n e w h a  t v e r y  r.uc h
3. ~ f T) o i l ]  be t h e  p r e f e r r e d  node- of  a l l o c a t i o n  w h e n  t h e  m a n a g e r  w e i g L t r- 
i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  w o u l d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  o n  e m p l o y e e  is  or  is  n ot  in n e e d  cf  a n 
incrca.i'’ in  pay. T h e  m a n a g e r  e m p l o y i n g  t h i s  m o d e  is m o s t  i n t e r e s t e d  i r. the 
p e r s o n a )  w e l f a r e  of  t h e  e m p l o y e e .
T h e  c r i t e r i a  l i s t e d  by t he  m a n a g e r  t o  b e  i n p o r t e n t  f or  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in an 
e m p l o y e e ’s p a y / s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e  w e r e  r e l a t e d  to n e e d
1 2  3 A 5 6 7
n o t  at a ll  s o m e w h a t  v e r y  m u c h
A, O T U L h  or C O 111'. I A T I  f>‘i w i l l  be  t h e  m o d e  of  a l l o c a t i o n  w h e n  c r i t e r i a  a r e  w e i g h t e d  
w h i c h  d o  not f a l l  d i s t i n c t l y  i n t o  o n e  of t he  a b o v e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  o r  i n v o l v e s  s o n e  
o b v i o u s  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a b o v e  c a t e g o r i e s .
T h e  c r i t e r i a  l i s t e d  by t h e  m a n a g e r  to  lie i m p o r t a n t  for c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in  an 
e m p l o y e e ’s p a y / s a l a r y  i n c r e a s e  w e r e  r e l a t e d  to s o m e  o t h e r  m o d e  o r  s o m e  
c o n b i n a t  ion:
1 2 
n o t  at  a l l
3 A 5
s o n c w h a L
6 7
v e r y  m u c h
APPENDIX N
Statements Descriptive of Mode of Allocat 
Used in Last Pay Increase
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C o ec i  t he  o ^ e  s t e t e r e n t  w h i c h  m o s t  c l o s e ] )  d e s c r i b e s  h o w  y o u  f ee l  t h at  \ o l
el l o c a t e d  t h e  psy i n c r e a s e s  f or  y o u r  e m p l o y e e s  on  t h e  l a s t  p a y  i n c r e a s e '
  1. L q u i t ;  - T h a t  is, r y  h i g h e s t  p e r f o r m e r s  r e c e i v e  t h e  h i g h e s t  pa;, r a i s e ,
a n d  t h e  l o - e s i  p c r f o r r . e r s  r e c e i v e  t he  l o w e s t  p a y  i n c r e a s e ; ,  (c. p .,  
nc-r 1 i n c r e a s e s ) .
  2. E q u e l i t v  - T h a t  is, a l l  of n y  e m p l o y e e s  w i l l  r e c e i v e  e q u a l ,  cr a c r o s s -
t h e - b o a r d ,  pa; r a i s e s .
  j. N e e d  - T n a t  is, 1 c o n s i d e r  r; e m p l o y e e s  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  n e e ;  for the
p a ;. raise- f i r s t .
  L . B o t h  E q u i t y  e n d  E q u a l i t y  - T h a t  is, e q u a l  or a c r o s s - t h e - b o e r c  p.v,
r a i s e s  e r e  g i v e n ,  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  of o u t s t a n d i n g l y  h ig r  cr 1 o> 
pe  rf o r r e  r s .
_ _ _  w. B o t h  E q u i t ;  a n d  N e e d  - T h a t  is, tcy h i g h e s t  p e r f o r m e r s  r e c e i v e  h i g he r
p a; r a i s e s .  B n d  my l o w e s t  p e r f o r m e r s  r e c e i v e  l o w e r  r a i s e : ,  w i t h  
e x c e p t i o n s  t a k e n  f o r  e m p l o y e e s  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  of  g r e e t  n e e d  cr of 
l i t t l e  r e e d  f or  t h e  p a y  i n c r e a s e .
  C, B o t h  E q u a l i t y  a n d  N e e d  - T h a t  is, tr.) e m p l o y e e s  r e c e i v e  e q u a l  , cr
a c r o s s -  t h e - b o a r d ,  p a y  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  e x c e p t i o n s  t a k e r  for e ~ ; l o y e e s  
i ri s i t u a t i o n s  o f g r e a t  n e e d  o r o f l i t t l e  n e e d  f o r  t he  pa; i n c r e a s e
  7. O t h e r  ■ *!; s i t u a t i o n  h a s  n ot  b e e n  d e s c r i b e d  a d e q u a t e l y .  ( P l e a s e
d e s c r i b e  in t h e  s p a c e  p r o v i d e d ) :
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APPENDIX 0 
Vignettes
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Please read the four employees' personnel files. The files provide general 
Information concerning the employee, the employee's most recent performance 
appraisal rating, and general comments which the supervisor has made concerning 
the employee. Assume that these four enplojees are your subordinates. Based on 
the information presented in their files, and following organlxational policy for 
pay increases, please allocate $1,000 among the four employees.
$____  1. Ken Franklir
$____  2. Robert Harris
$______  3. J o s e p h  Brown
$____  4. Stephen Hill
Once again, please read the four employees’ personnel files, and assume that 
these four employees are your subordinates, This time, based on the information 
presented in their files, and following your preferences for pay increases, 
please allocate SI,ODD aoong the four employees.
£_____  1 . her, Frark 1 i r.
S  2. Robert Harris
S  3. J o s e p h  E r o v -
S  4. Stephen Hill
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AMERICAN DRILLING t OIL EXPLORATION COMP ANT PERSOHNEL FILE: Ken Fnnklin
SSN 414-86-6*55
ADDRESS: 1621 Creencreat Dr
Baton Rouge. LA 10620 
DATE OF BIRTII : 4-21-40
HEIGHT 6'0"
MARITAL STATUS: Married
MOST RECENT PERFORMANCE RATING:
TELEPHONE: 166-7026
SEX : M
WEIGHT: 175 lbs
DEPENDENTS: 5
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AMEnI CAN DRILLING ft OIL EXPLORATION COMPANY PERSONNEL FILE: Robtrt Harris
SOll 433- 11 - 4456
ADDRESS: 9066 Wilderness Dr.
Union Rouge, LA 7BOOO 
DATE OF BIRTH: 6-16-43
HE!CUT: 6'2"
MARITAL STATUS: Married
MOST RECENT PERFORMANCE RATIIIC:
TELEPHONE: 380-2999
SEX : M
WEICUT: 197 lbs.
DEPENDENTS: 2
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AMERICAN DRILLING t OIL EXPLORATION COMPANY PERSONNEL PILE: Joseph Brown
SSN: 434-67-8896
ADDRESS: 8165 Rosewood Dr.
Baton Rouge, LA 70B0I TELEPHONE: 925-8570
DATE OF BIRTH: 3-5-46 SEX: M
HEIGHT: 5 ’'1M WEIGHT: 175 lba.
MARITAL STATUS: Married DEPENDENTS: 2
MOST RECENT PERFORMANCE RATING:
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AMERICAN DRILLINO A OIL EXPLORATION COMPANY PERSONNEL FILE: Stephen Hill
SSN: 4)3-55-3421
ADDRESS: 9)22 Seascape Lane
Baton Rouge, LA 7089B 
DATE OF BIRTH: 8-8-48
HEIGHT: 6*2"
MARITAL STATUS: Married
MOST RECENT PERFORMANCE RATINQ:
TELEPHONE: 922-23)0
SEX : M
WEIGHT: 210 lbs.
DEPENDENTS: 2
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Footnote
*The analyses for the organizational goals variable were also 
performed using continuous data, and the results were identical.
2
The analyses for the managerial goals variable were also 
performed using continuous data, and the results were identical.
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